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Thus  far the chief purpose of our military establishment 
has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose 
must be to avert them. 
Bernard Brodie 
The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order 
1946 
Sixty years ago, the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie took 
serious stock of the military threats and missions in a world 
with atomic bombs. Brodie recognized that this new class of 
weapons would cause intolerable destruction, and therefore that 
the United States could no longer afford to wait for an enemy to 
strike first. For much of the half century that followed, the 
United States and its allies relied on deterrence and when 
necessary limited conflicts to avert strikes such as the attack on 
Pearl Harbor that had brought the United States reluctantly 
into the Second World War. More recently, the nature of threats 
that the United States and its allies face has changed; now, 
enemies who cannot be deterred are seeking to possess weapons 
of mass destruction. While the prospect of non-state messianic 
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actors obtaining these weapons dramatically expands the range 
of catastrophic threats, the means the military establishment 
has to avert wars has not grown accordingly. 
Because the international security system is premised on 
exceedingly strong notions of national sovereignty, the United 
States may not seize a shipload of nuclear weapons moving from 
North Korea to Iran for ultimate use by terrorists. Russia may 
not force the landing of an airplane carrying anthrax from the 
Sudan to Chechnya until that craft enters Russian airspace. In 
other words, terrorists, revolutionaries, and rogue states are 
virtually free to ship weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as 
they wish. Without some significant changes to the system, the 
use of WMD against civilians seems all but inevitable. 
This Article addresses one significant undertaking that 
seeks to change the system by enabling concerned states to 
interdict international trade in weapons of mass destruction. As 
such, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI or the Initiative) 
not only addresses one of the most urgent threats to peace and 
security that the world has ever witnessed, but it does so in an 
innovative way that has the potential to change the basic 
paradigm of peace and security by legitimizing the proportional 
and discriminating use of force to prevent a great harm. 
This Article proceeds in seven Parts. Part I introduces the 
Initiative and discusses some of the legal, political and strategic 
issues it raises. A more detailed legal analysis follows in Part VI 
but only after some analysis of the political and strategic issues 
that drive the Initiative. Part I1 discusses the threats that the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose and the ways 
that the Initiative seeks to address them. Precisely because the 
PSI is "an activity not an organization" its structure and 
activities have not been articulated with much detail. The PSI'S 
founding document is a Statement of Interdiction Principles 
reproduced in the appendix to this Article. Part I11 presents 
those few operational details that are publicly available. 
Likewise, the PSI'S amorphous structure leaves considerable 
ambiguity about what it means to participate in the Initiative. 
Part IV addresses what is entailed in joining the PSI. Part of the 
Initiative's brilliance lies in its flexibility, but this design 
element makes it difficult to identify who is participating and at 
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what level. It also leaves open questions about whom the 
Initiative targets. To date, the Initiative has focused on 
operations to interdict the flow of weapons at sea, a prospect 
that raises significant legal concerns because a theoretical 
interdiction might contravene the strong tradition of freedom of 
the seas. As noted above, Part V examines the legal framework 
in which the PSI operates: the existing and potential legal 
arguments that would or would not permit interdiction 
shipments of WMDs. Part VI picks up the thread by examining 
the efforts to deal with these legal issues through the essentially 
political actions of the United Nations Security Council. Finally 
Part VII draws some conclusions and makes a few concrete 
recommendations about how to build support and improve the 
fit between the PSI and its critical mission. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
AND ITS OBJECTIVES 
The Proliferation Security Initiative is a multilateral 
initiative intended to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) and the materials used to construct 
them.' "The goal of the PSI is to create a more dynamic, creative, 
and proactive approach to preventing proliferation transfers to 
or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation 
con~ern."~ To accomplish this objective, the PSI establishes links 
to facilitate information sharing between ~ountries.~ The 
Initiative organizes multinational exercises to train for the 
interdiction of these weapons on the high seas or the airspace 
above them. The PSI'S activities are intended mostly to enable 
its supporters to identify cross-border trafficking in WMD and to 
halt it. It explicitly contemplates boarding ships and, if 
1. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY 
INITIATIVE (June 2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/productdpubdproliferation 
[hereinabr U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS]. 
2. Id. In September 2003, eleven "countries agreed to and published the 
Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles. These identify 
specific steps for effectively interdicting weapons of mass destruction shipments and 
preventing proliferation facilitators from engaging in this deadly trade. Participation is 
voluntary. Id. 
3. Id. 
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necessary, using armed forces to seize weapons and the 
materials used to make them.4 Its Statement of Interdiction 
Principles also includes undertakings by its participants to 
board and search vessels reasonably suspected of transporting 
WMD, including their delivery systems, and to refrain from 
transporting WMD themsel~es.~ Its signatories also undertake 
to consider providing consent to boarding and searching vessels 
carrying their flags.6 Subsequent bilateral agreements have 
been signed to allow the United States to board ships bearing 
flags of convenience under certain circu~nstances.~ 
Since its inception, the Initiative's efforts have focused on 
halting the flow of WMD across the world's oceans. In the 
future, its activities may extend to land-based interdictions. 
Most of the participants in PSI exercises like these are the naval 
and air forces of the United States and the various regional 
powers that would presumably undertake any interdiction in the 
future. 
President George W. Bush announced the Initiative in 
Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003.' A few months later, eleven 
states signed a Statement of Interdiction Principles, a document 
ambitious in scope but providing very few detailsg Since that 
time, the PSI has gained widespread support from U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan and more than seventy states, 
including those traditionally known as the "Great Powers," 
including Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
4. Id. 
5. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE, STATEMENT OF 
INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http:/lusinfo.state.gov/produds/pu 
bs/proliferation#statement bereinafter STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES]. This 
material is reproduced in the appendix of this Article. 
6. Id. 
7 .  See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security, Remarks with H.E. Arnulfo Escalona, Minister of Government and Justice of 
Panama: Signing of the U.S.-Panama Ship Boarding Agreement to Support the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (May 12, 2004). 
8. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks by the President to 
the People of Poland (May 31,2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releas 
es/2003/05/20030531-3.html. 
9. See STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRI CIPLES, supm note 5. 
Heinonline - -  28 Hous. J. Int'l L. 775 2006 
776 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W [Vol. 28:3 
Turkey, and spain.'' Unfortunately, some states have not 
endorsed it. This Article examines some of the reasons the 
Initiative has not garnered universal support and proposes ways 
to achieve it. 
The Initiative is both bold and timely. It constitutes one of 
the most important positive recent developments in the area of 
international peace and security to date and may also add up to 
the most exciting change in the area of public international law. 
In particular, it may fundamentally alter the transnational legal 
framework for the use of force by states. As it gains acceptance, 
force may become a more ordinary tool for ensuring compliance 
with the dictates of international security. By blurring the lines 
between war and peace, the PSI permits the use of force to 
advance security objectives without triggering the rubric of war. 
And yet, despite the Initiative's novelty and importance, it has 
attracted remarkably little scholarly or policy-relevant 
attention." Moreover, because the Initiative lacks a central 
office, an international secretariat, an operational handbook, 
rules of engagement, and congressional authorization, it 
remains somewhat shrouded in mystery. 
While this novel Initiative is highly innovative in its 
conceptualization, responding to one of the most urgent sets of 
problems society faces, the PSI raises several significant legal 
lo .  U.S. DEFT OF STATE, FACT SHEET, PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ) (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/tJisn/rls/ 
fd46839.htm; U.S. Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Hearing on Fiscal 2007: Emerging Threats Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats 
and Capabilities of the S. Comm. on the Armed Serus., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of 
Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security); Fabrice Pothier, The Proliferation Security Znitiatiue: Towards A New Anti- 
Proliferation Consensus?, BASIC (BR. AM. SECURITY INFO. COUNCIL) NOTES, Nov. 18, 
2004, available at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN041118.htm. 
11. The PSI has been the subject of almost no in-depth reporting. The most 
attention the Initiative has received from the media is in respect to the nomination of its 
progenitor, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 
AtTairs John Bolton, to serve as  U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In this respect, 
the PSI has received scores of mentions in the national media but little analysis. For a 
bibliography of the PSI and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, see Mark R. 
Shulman, Proliferation Security Initiative and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 
(Oct. 2005) (unpublished bibliography), http:/Aibrary.law.pace.edu/research/psi- 
bibliography.pdf. 
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and policy issues in its implementation. The fact that it raises 
issues should not be surprising. Significant changes to 
international norms have always faced obstacles; that is the 
nature of complex systems. Historical examples abound. For 
instance, consensus was slow to form around such momentous 
issues as the outlawing of piracy, the slave trade, and 
eventually, genocide. More recently, the international 
community has been hesitant to outlaw aviation piracy or other 
- 
acts of terrorism. And now the international community is 
halting and unsure about how to proceed in the face of nuclear 
proliferation. The PSI is acting as a catalyst for the development 
of a new norm that allows the use of force to interdict the flow of 
WMD. 
A definitive conclusion about the legal status of the 
Initiative is elusive for several reasons related to  its lack of a 
discernable structure. Different states have presented diverging 
views of the relevant law that governs the Initiative's 
activities.'' Also, because the PSI seeks to address proliferation 
events as they arise, no one knows yet what actions its members 
will take and, therefore, what legal arguments will be required 
to support them. Finally, the PSI contains the seed of a new 
kind of law-a universal ban on the proliferation of WMD'~-~I I~  
this law has yet to be fully articulated, let alone tested. 
As the lead participant, the United States' legal position is 
critical and has been evolving since 2003. Then Undersecretary 
of State John R. Bolton defended the PSI'S legality at the time 
based on the right to collective self-defense.14 This justification 
proved to be overreaching. Other PSI core members failed to 
12. See, e.g., Barry W .  Coceano, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Challenges 
and Perceptions, ATLANTIC OUNCIL OF THE U.S. (OCCASIONAL PAPER), 14-16 (2004), 
available at http://www.acus.org/docdO4O5%20Proliferation~Security~Initiative~Challen 
ges-Perceptions.pdf (discussing debates on the legal issues surrounding the Proliferation 
Security Initiative). 
13. STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES supra note 5 .  
14. John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, 
Remarks to the Federalist Society: "Legitimacy" in International Affairs: The American 
Perspective in Theory and Operation (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
Vudd26143.htm. 
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endorse it, and Secretary Bolton subsequently dropped it.'' More 
recently, the U.S. State Department has vaguely claimed PSI 
activities will be consistent with domestic and international 
legal frameworks, many of which in turn implement existing 
nonproliferation structures.16 While this claim is generally 
accurate, it deserves detailed analysis and explanation to justify 
it in the face of contrary claims and also to  spell out some of the 
opportunities that widespread endorsement of the PSI opens. 
Going further, this Article will also argue that in order to 
implement the PSI, its supporters are altering international law 
in ways that may increase the scope and relevance of regulation 
of the international security regime. 
To meet a global threat, the PSI is ambitious in its 
geographic scope. Traffic in WMD may originate almost 
anywhere and, in light of the intention of some non-state actors 
to obtain them," they may be bound for almost anywhere. 
Countries of origin could include North Korea, Iran, China, 
Syria, Pakistan, India, Israel, Vietnam, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, 
Cuba, Russia, and almost any of the other former Soviet 
15. See Jofi Joseph, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop 
Proliferation?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June 1, 2004, available a t  http://www.armscontrol 
.orglact/2004~06Noseph.asp. On the other hand, the PSI'S defenders found authority in 
the U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which stated that 
IVMD proliferation is a threat to international peace and security and emphasized the 
need for its prevention, and various political statements originating in the United 
Nations and elsewhere. John Harrington, Arms Control and National Security, 38 INT'L 
L. 391,392 (2004). 
16. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): A Record of Success (2005) 
(testimony of Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Sec'y of State for Arms Control, Before 
the H. Int'l Relations Comm., Subcomm. on Int'l Terrorism and Nonproliferation), 
http:Nwww.state.govlt/adrls/d47715.htm. 
17. See Jon B. Wolfsthal, The Next Nuclear Wave, FOREIGN AFF., Jan-Feb. 2005, 
available a t  http://www.foreignaffairs.orgl20050101fare~ewessay~114djon- 
b%20wolfsthal/the-next-nuclear-wave.htm1 (citing GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR 
TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE CATASTROPHE Ch. 1 (2004) (providing a 
distressing litany of non-state actors seeking to acquire nuclear weapons)). This list 
includes: A1 Qaeda, its various related organizations and copycats operating around the 
world; Jemaah Islamiyah (active in Southeast Asia); Chechen nationalists; and 
Hezbollah (active in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East). Id. The list could also 
include Majlis-e-Amal and other pro-Taliban anti-U.S. organizations operating in and 
around Pakistan, Afghanistan, and countless doomsday cults around the world (similar 
to Aum Shinrikyo or the Branch Davidians). Others might add Andean drug cartels. 
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republics. From there, the weapons could be transshipped 
anywhere on earth before arriving at their ultimate destination 
or target. Therefore, the threat is global. 
In the face of a global threat, who sets the strategy? The PSI 
declarations to date leave ambiguous its decision-making 
apparatus. Who will decide when and how to act? What role does 
the United States play? Is the decision-making process entirely 
ad hoc? The Statement of Interdiction Principles does not 
establish any detailed policies relating to the Initiative's 
purpose, decision-making apparatus, targets, or means.'' The 
Statement of Principles does elaborate somewhat on the concept: 
"States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" 
generally refers to those countries or entities that the 
PSI participants involved establish should be subject to 
interdiction activities because they are engaged in 
proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire 
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated 
delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, 
receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery 
systems, or related  material^.'^ 
This formal statement begs more questions than it answers. Is 
there a list of states or non-state actors of concern? What is 
required in order to establish that they should be subject to 
interdiction activities? Are radioactive materials that could be 
used to create radiological devices (i.e. dirty bombs) subject to 
interdiction? Why are some states permitted to acquire WMD 
and transfer them? Which states? 
Informal statements do provide additional insights into the 
Initiative's objectives. Its architect, John Bolton, has stated that 
the Initiative will not target states that possess WMD 
"legitimately."20 This statement presupposes a legal conclusion 
about legitimacy that can only be vaguely drawn in the absence 
of established rules. Presumably it means that at least China, 
Russia, Great Britain, and France will not be subjected to the 
18. See id. 
19. Id. 
20. Wade Boese, The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John 
Bolton, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2003, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/20 
03-12JPSI.asp. 
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Initiative's interdiction efforts so long as they do not export 
these weapons to rogue states or non-state actors." As long-time 
declared nuclear powers under the terms of the Treaty on the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and each wielding 
a U.N. Security Council veto, they appear to be insulated from 
the reach of the PSI. 
Other informal statements about the PSI'S objectives are 
less vague but are self-contradicting. A British government 
expert states that the PSI does 
not target any country or countries in particular. 
Rather, the goal is to prevent the development or 
acquisition of WMD by all non-state actors (such as 
terrorists) and states of concern, together with those 
who supply such programmes through trafficking in 
sensitive materials, equipment and technology- 
whether states, individuals, private companies or other 
en ti tie^.^' 
The fact that there are some "states of concern" appears to 
belie the claim that the PSI does not target any countries in 
particular. The ambiguity and tension inherent in that 
statement are indicative of the fluidity of the Initiative. It does 
not target any specific country while at the same time 
21. The July 2003 PSI Meeting in Brisbane cited North Korea and Iran as  two 
states of particular concern. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Proliferation Security 
Initiative: Chairman's Statement a t  the Second Meeting (July 10, 20031, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isnlrls/other/25377.htm [hereinafter PSI Chairman's Statement]; 
see also The Proliferation Security Znitiatiue: A Vision Becomes Reality (May 31, 2004) 
(remarks of John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., to the First 
Anniversary Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative, http://www.state.gov/t/us/ 
d 3 3 0 4 6 . h t m  (citing North Korea, Iran and Syria as  "states of proliferation concernn); 
Andrew Prosser & Herbert Scoville, Jr., The Proliferation Security Znitiatiue in 
Perspectiue, CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., June 16, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf (citing to 
S123500, Jan.  31, 1992). For the purposes of this Article, WMD will include those 
materials targeted by .the PSI as  components of WMD. Eventually, the distinction may 
be enormous, but those distinctions will only arise with specific situations. It  is also 
worth noting that the sources may not be state actors, and that even governments have 
elements that  may be capable of proliferation without such acts being sanctioned by 
state policy. 
22. Letter from Matthew Hamlyn, Head, Parliamentary Relations and Devolution 
Dep't, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Committee Specialist (July 5, 2004), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaf 411441we27.htm 
(emphasis added). 
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preventing proliferation to or from states of concern. It is this 
sort of ambiguity-and the apparent discretion it permits-that 
causes some commentators to question whether the PSI 
conforms to the rule of law.23 Vague policy statements about 
states of concern, however, are not the same thing as acts of 
violence, and the PSI'S legitimacy cannot be prejudged on the 
basis of these statements alone. Ultimately, the actions on the 
behalf of the PSI and the law that governs those actions will 
determine the Initiative's legitimacy. The outcomes will 
illuminate its wisdom. 
Likewise, it remains unclear how the PSI'S participants will 
act if faced with information indicating that a shipment of WMD 
originated in a state that is neither a party to the NPT, a long- 
standing nuclear power (Israel), nor a powerful state with 
considerable international leverage such as India or ~ a k i s t a n . ~ ~  
Given Pakistan's recent history and its apparent inability or 
unwillingness to halt the export of WMD, claims that it will get 
a free pass seem premature.25 But as proliferation expert David 
Albright notes, "This is the age-old problem with Pakistan and 
the U.S. Other priorities always trump the United States from 
coming down hard on Pakistan's nuclear proliferation. And it 
23. Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal 
Challenges, 14 J .  TRANSNAT'L . & POL'Y 253, 256-63 (2005); see also Ian Patrick Barry, 
The Right of Visit, Search and Seizure of Foreign Flagged Vessels on the High Seas 
Pursuant to Customary International Law: A Defense of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 299, 301 (2004); Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation 
Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and International Law, 30 
YALE J. INT'L L. 507 (2005). 
24. Until North Korea's unprecedented announcement of its intention to withdraw 
in 2003, India, Pakistan and Israel were the only major states not party to the NPT. 
Devon Chaffee, North Korea's Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Oficial, 
WAGINGPEACE.ORG, Apr. 10,2003, http:Nwww.wagingpeace.org/articled2003/0411O~~haff 
ee-korea-npt.htm. All state parties are required to permit inspectors to ensure their 
nuclear materials are not diverted to illegal weapons programs. U.S. Statement at the 
2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (2005) (remarks of Stephen G. 
Rademaker, Assistant Sec'y of State for Arms Control), http~//www.state.gov/t/adrls/rm/ 
45518.htm. 
25. See Prosser & Scoville, supra note 21, a t  6. Pakistan's participation is 
important. If President Pewez Musharraf believes that  signing the PSI would be 
domestically unpopular, he could sign it clandestinely. There is no reason that  the 
parties to the PSI must each sign a public declaration. In fact, private deals may make 
sense and would be entirely legitimate-at least under international law. 
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goes back 15 to 20 years."26 Likewise, proliferation expert Gary 
Milhollin notes "it seems bizarre that we are letting the 
Pakistanis get away with nuclear smuggling because we think 
they'll help fight terrori~m."~' However, the best evidence 
publicly available suggests that India, Pakistan, and Israel will 
not be targeted-at least for now.28 
The case of Pakistan illustrates the PSI'S potential for 
changing the use of force paradigm to achieve international 
peace and security. Clearly, from a counter-proliferation 
perspective, the PSI should not grant Pakistan a free ride. Other 
important considerations arise, however, because of Pakistan's 
role as a critical ally in the struggle against terr~rism.~' One of 
the PSI'S greatest strengths is the flexibility it offers. The 
traditional international security order viewed the world as 
governed by fully sovereign states with a small number of states 
whose sovereignty is temporarily impaired--either because they 
are "failed" states, client states, or those subject to U.N. 
sanctions. Traditionally international law does not offer much 
support to those seeking to discriminate between the rights of 
diffeiment states based on an interpretation of their so-called 
legitimacy. Instead it treats the legitimacy and sovereignty of all 
states with equal dignity except in those few instances in which 
states violate obligations that are either self-imposed by custom 
or treaty, or imposed upon them by the U.N. Security Council. 
In contrast, the PSI implies a less rigid concept of sovereign 
autonomy in which a state no longer has complete freedom to 
engage in reckless activities that endanger another's security. 
The PSI must prevent weak states from trafficking in WMD 
without further undermining their capacity to govern 
themselves. The United States can neither afford to ignore 
26. Josh Meyer, Illegal Nuclear Deals Alleged, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26,2005, at A8. 
27. Id. 
28. See Wade Boese, Research Dir., Arms Control Ass'n, Presentation to the 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Panel Discussion: Implications of U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1540 (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/eventsl2OO 
50315-1540.asp (citing speaker's recent i n t e ~ e w  ith John Bolton). 
29. See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush 
and President Musharraf of Pakistan Discuss Strengthened Relationship (Mar. 4, 2006), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/OO60304-2.html. 
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Pakistan's proliferation nor to destabilize or alienate its 
government. 
Eventually the PSI must develop enough support that it can 
halt proliferation from all countries, including powerful ones or 
those that have special influence as allies in the global struggle 
against terrorism. Granting free passes to oneself or one's 
friends runs contrary to the basic principles of the rule of law. It 
sets the grantor and the grantee above the law. The rule of law 
is premised upon the notion that no one is above it, and for the 
PSI to support a transnational order based on this principle, it 
should do everything feasible to abide by the rule of law itself. 
On the other hand, it may take years for supporters of the PSI to 
establish the legal capacity to target important countries that 
proliferate. In the meantime, an excess of solicitousness for the 
- 
most robust interpretations of the rule of law should not be 
permitted to cripple the entire effort. This Article proposes that 
the best course is to embrace the objectives of the PSI and strive 
to strengthen it as an important counter-proliferation tool. 
A. A New Form of Multilateralism 
The Initiative offers a new model for multilateral 
cooperation that avoids cumbersome treaty apparatus. The 
postwar system of international peace and security is framed in 
great part by such treaties. From the beginning, the presidential 
administration of George W. Bush has been notoriously 
unfriendly to traditional multilateral conventions. Prior to 
September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration abandoned 
negotiations on START 11,~' decided not to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban  rea at^,^^ and soon thereafter withdrew 
the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile   re at^.^' It 
stalled efforts to improve the Biological Weapons Convention 
30. Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, To Sway Russia, Bush Will Propose 
Cuts to Nuclear Arsenal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2001, at A6 (noting that Start I1 had still 
not taken effect). 
31. Tom Shanker & David E. Sanger, White House Wants to Bury Pact Banning 
Tests of Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7,2001, at  Al.  
32. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, ABM Treaty Fact Sheet: 
Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Dec. 13, 2001), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/l2/2OOll2l3-2.html. 
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33 
regime. It failed to encourage ratification of the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea despite strong support in 
Congress, the Department of State, and the Department of 
~ e f e n s e . ~ ~  The Bush Administration took the unprecedented 
step of "un-signing" the 1998 Rome Charter of the International 
Criminal Court. The Administration's antipathy to exposing 
Americans to charges in international tribunals is so strong it 
expended considerable diplomatic capital to  ensure blanket 
exemptions for Americans before the new International 
Criminal Court despite the Rome Charter's provisions and 
political considerations making any such prosecution 
exceptionally unlikely.35 
At the same time, the Administration's efforts to build 
multinational coalitions have been widely derided as fig leaves 
for unilateral action. These complaints, whatever their merit, do 
not mean the Administration has been ignoring the roles other 
states can play in maintaining peace and security. The PSI 
represents a prominent example of the Administration's 
thinking about how to build transnational support to protect 
American interests. It envisions a new kind of multilateral 
security agreement--one with considerable advantages over the 
heavily negotiated and thus cumbersome treaties that lawyers 
and diplomats are accustomed to creating. While it is beyond the 
33. See Devon Chaffee, Freedom or  Force on the High Seas? Arms Interdiction and 
International Law, WAGINGPEACE.ORG, Aug. 15,2003, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articl 
es/2003/08/15-chaffee-freedom-of-force.htm. 
34. MARJORIE A. BROWNE, CONG. RES. SERV., THE U.N. LAW OF THE SEA 
CONVENTION AND THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENTS INCE OCTOBER 2003 (20051, 
available a t  http:lhKww.fas.org/sgp/crslrow/RS2l89O.pdf (noting that though it had been 
voted favorably out of committee in the Senate and pushed by Department of State 
officials, it languished in the 108th Congress). 
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, AMERICAN 
SERVICE-MEMBER'S PROTECTION Am (20031, available a t  http://www.state.gov/tJpm/rls/ 
othr/misc/23425.htm. All this is in addition to the protections embodied both in the 
United States' veto a t  the Security Council and the Rome Charter's provisions for 
complementarity, that is authorization for indictments only when the state does not have 
the capacity to indict or investigate. The Rome Statute emphasizes "the International 
Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Pmbl., July 
17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, available a t  http://www.un.orgAaw/icc/statute/ 
romefra.htm. 
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scope of this Article to explore them all, other U.S.-led 
transnational security initiatives since 9/11 should at least be 
noted to give the reader an idea of their range and scope. In 
addition to the  PSI,^^ they include the Container Security 
~nitiative,~' the Customs-Trade Partnerships against 
  error ism,^' the Regional Maritime Security ~nitiative,~' and the 
Global Threat Reduction ~nitiative.~' Also, the PSI has a 
nonproliferation analogue in the Global Partnership Against the 
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass ~estruction.~' Each is 
an activity, not an organization. Not one of the initiatives 
established is chartered by a multilateral treaty that has been 
signed and ratified by each participant. And yet, cumulatively, 
these initiatives may be building a new system that responds 
effectively and legitimately to the security demands of the 
twenty-first century. 
36. See generally Prosser & Scoville, supra note 21, a t  2; PSI Chairman's 
Statement, supra note 21; STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 5. 
37. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FACT SHEET (2006), 
h t t p : / / w w w . c u s t o m s . g o v / l i n k h a n d l e r / c g o v / b s i ~  
fact-sheet.ctt/csi-fact-sheet.doc [hereinafter U.S. CUSTOMS FACT SHEET]. 
38. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER CONTROL, PARTNERSHIP TO SECURE THE 
SUPPLY CHAIN: CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM, 
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercialeorcemenVctpaV (last visited Apr. 
2, 2006). 
39. See Regional Maritime Security Initiative, GLOBALSECUIRTY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/rmsi.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006) 
[hereinafter RMSA. 
40. See IAEA STAFF REPORT, IAEA WELCOMES US NEW GLOBAL THREAT 
REDUCTION INITIATIVE (2004), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2004/GTRI- 
Initiative.htm1. 
41. See Group of Eight Leaders, The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (June 27, 2002), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rl 
s/othr/ll514.htm. 
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Since the advent of the Nuclear Age, everything has 
changed save our modes of thinking and we thus drift 
toward unparalleled catastrophe. 
Albert   in stein^^ 
Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists 
present the greatest threat to our ci~ilization.~~ In the hands of a 
terrorist group, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons could 
cause the deaths of thousands, or even millions, of innocent 
people. During a debate with Senator John F. Kerry during the 
2004 campaign, President Bush said, "I agree with my opponent 
that the biggest threat facing this country is weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of a terrorist network."44 The more 
widely such weapons are distributed, the more likely their use. 
These weapons, or the means to  build them, are increasingly 
accessible to  states and non-state actors alike. The threat of 
widespread disease or  death posed by naturally or 
42. Robert Holt, Can Psychology Meet Einstein's Challenge?, POL. PSYCHOL. 5(2), 
1984, a t  199-225 (citing a fund-raising letter for the Emergency Committee of Atomic 
Scientists written by Albert Einstein in May 1946). 
43. A note on terminology: any strategy to prevent WMD attacks has several 
components, traditionally labeled "deterrence," "nonproliferation," "counter-proliferationn 
and "preemption." Deterrence remains basically unchanged from its classic Cold War 
formulation in which a potential adversary is dissuaded from launching an attack for 
fear of a response that would more than negate the advantages gained by such an attack. 
The concept of preemption has evolved over the years and is, indeed, in flux, due mostly 
to the U.S. arguments (mostly related to the distinctions between preemption and 
prevention) and actions in early 2003 leading up to the Iraq war. Nonproliferation is a 
more complex set of efforts to limit the spread of technology, expertise, and weapons 
through such means as  classifying weapons technology and otherwise limiting its export 
or accessibility, enhancing border technologies and training personnel at  border 
crossings, sponsoring peaceful work of nuclear scientists, or building and maintaining 
international verification systems. Counter-proliferation "focuses on more aggressive 
activities, such as  covert action and military strikes. . . ." Frank J. Cilluffo et  al., CSIS 
REPORT, COMBATING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM: 
A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY xi (2001). 
44. Presidential Debate in Coral Gables, Florida, 40 WEEKLY COW. PRES. DOC. 
2175, 2192 (Sept. 30, 2004); see also Graham Allison, The Gravest Danger, AM. 
PROSPECT, Mar. 2005, at 48. 
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unintentionally occurring agents such as zoonotic diseases45 or 
gigantic meteors46 may eventually prove more deadly, but the 
likelihood of these threats seems impossible to establish. The 
eventual use of WMD against civilians seems likely. Harvard's 
Graham Allison grimly forecasts that "on the current path, a 
nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more 
likely than not."47 The PSI is one new tool in the effort to prevent 
such attacks. One of its strengths is that it does not pretend to 
be a silver bullet; rather it forms part of a growing network of 
networks, each adding layers of security. A silver bullet might 
miss its target, but a network of defenses would reduce the 
threat with every layer. 
A. Political Support from International Institutions 
International support for the PSI is widespread but 
ambivalent. As noted above, the U.S. government claims that at 
least seventy nations are participating in the Initiative, but a 
comprehensive statement listing those states and the actual 
level of participation has not been released.4s Individual states 
that participate in the Initiative are discussed below. First, 
however, this Article discusses the support of the most 
politically significant international entities: the United Nations 
and the European Union. Later, in Part VI, it will examine the 
legal arguments to support counter-proliferation and the PSI. 
The United Nations has endorsed the PSI concept but 
45. William B. Karesh & Robert A. Cook, The Human-Animal Link, FOREIGN AFF., 
JulyIAug. 2005, at 38, 40 (explaining that zoonotic diseases "originated in  animals but 
have crossed the species barrier to infect peoplen); see also Laurie Garrett, The Next 
Pandemic, FOREIGN A m . ,  JulytAug. 2005, at 3 (explaining such threats generally). 
46. See Evan R. Seamone, The Duty to "Expect the Unexpected": Mitigating Extreme 
Natural Threats to the Global Commons Such as Asteroid and Comet Impacts with the 
Earth, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L . 735, 794 (2003) (discussing the legal consequences of 
catastrophic events). 
47. GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE 
CATASTROPHE 15 (2004). 
48. U.S. Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Hearing on Fiscal 2007: Emerging Threats Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats 
and Capabilities of the S. Comm. on the Armed Servs., 109th Cong. (2006) hereinafter 
U.S. Strategy to Combat WMD] (statement o f  Robert G. Joseph, Under Sec'y of State for 
Arms Control and Int'l Sec.). 
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stopped short of requiring its member states to pass legislation 
to enact it when it passed Security Council Resolution 1540 
(UNSCR 1540) in April of 2004.~' Secretary General Annan has 
endorsed the PSI as integral to the nonproliferation regime: 
"President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative is another 
important step. These measures must be fully enf~rced."~' The 
Secretary General's report, In Larger Freedom, noted that while 
the NPT "remains the foundation of the non-proliferation 
regime, we should welcome recent efforts to supplement it."51 
Specifically, the report continues: 
These [efforts] include Security Council Resolution 1540 
(2004), designed to prevent non-state actors from 
gaining access to nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, technology and materials, and their means of 
delivery; and the voluntary Proliferation Security 
Initiative, under which more and more States are 
cooperating to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons.52 
Likewise the United Nations' Report of the High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change notes: 
Recent experience of the activities of the A.Q. Khan 
Network has demonstrated the need for and the value 
of measures taken to interdict the illicit and clandestine 
trade in components for nuclear programmes. This 
problem is currently being addressed on a voluntary 
basis by the Proliferation Security Initiative. We believe 
that all States should join this voluntary in i t i a t i~e .~~  
49. See S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th Mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRESl1540 
(2004). 
50. Kofi A. Annan, A Global Strategy for F igh t iq  Terrorism, THE HINDU, Mar. 12, 
2005, available at http://www.hindu.com~2005/03/12/~tories/2005031206711100.htm. 
51. See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Deuelopment, Security, and Human Rights for All, 1 100, deliuered to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at 
www.un.org/largerfreedorn/report-largerfreedom.pdf (emphasis added to note the 
recognition of an emerging norm that may ripen into customary international law). 
52. Id. 
53. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General's High-leuel Panel on 
Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 132, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A1591565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf. The 
father of the Pakistani, or the "Islamic bomb," Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, has confessed to 
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These statements contribute to the legitimacy of the PSI, 
politically and morally. Their jurisprudential significance, 
however, is ambiguous and evolving. At this point, the United 
Nations' contributions to  promoting the PSI, therefore, have 
been essentially limited to the Secretary General's voicing of 
support. And as long as China remains opposed, the United 
Nations' vast authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter 
will remain dormant with respect to the PSI. 
After the United Nations, the European Union (EU) is 
probably the next most significant source of the PSI'S political 
legitimacy. The EU's position has evolved quickly over the past 
couple of years with each new statement increasingly 
supportive. The EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction promulgated by the European Council in 
December 2003, did not explicitly mention the Initiative in its 
position against proliferation. An otherwise comprehensive 
document, it endorsed treaties and encouraged expansion of the 
EU's role in enhancing verification regimes, assistance 
programs, export controls, and other initiatives intended to 
improve the security of WMD materials, equipment, and 
expertise. It also included an ambiguous reference to considering 
"measures aimed at controlling the transit and transshipment of 
sensitive materials [and supporting] international initiatives 
aimed at  the identification, control and interception of illegal 
shipments."54 
On the first anniversary of the Krakow announcement, the 
EU and its member states went further and committed 
"themselves to contribute to the PSI and.  . . take the necessary 
steps in support of interdiction efforts."55 Somewhat cautiously, 
this commitment required the EU and its member states to 
selling nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistan's 
President Pervez Musharraf has confirmed that these transactions occurred but has 
denied knowing about them at the time. See Esther Pan, Nonproliferation: The Pakistan 
Network, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Feb. 12, 2004, http://www.cfi.org/publication~7751/. 
54. The Council of the European Union, EU Strategy Against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council Common Position No 2003/805/CFSP, at 12, 
available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsUpload/stl5708.enO3.pdf. 
55. General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC), Non-proliferation- 
Support of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (May 17, 2004), httpi/europa.eu.int 
/comm/external~relations/nuclear~safety/ic.htm. 
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"take the necessary steps in support of interdiction efforts to the 
extent their national and Community legal authorities permit 
and consistent with their obligations under international 
a56 law. . . . This statement illuminates several important 
distinctions between the U.S. and EU approaches to security 
and terrorism issues generally. It is also notable because the EU 
overcame these differences in defining the ultimate shape of the 
still inchoate PSI. 
First, the legal carve-outs in the EU endorsements are so 
prominent as to raise questions about the EU's willingness to 
commit at all. In contrast, only a few days earlier, a Japan-EU 
Declaration on Disarmament and Nonproliferation included no 
such carve-outs.57 The addition of the carve-outs in the EU's PSI 
statement seems like a blunt effort to cajole the United States to  
assume a more respectful attitude toward the significance of the 
rule of international law and the constraints it imposes on 
decisions to use force. This difference implies that the EU is 
willing to abandon the PSI if it engages in military activities 
that are inconsistent with international law. 
Second, the EU's endorsement emphasizes the intelligence 
and law enforcement aspects of the PSI-not its military 
 measure^.^' Similarly, at a recent PSI exercise hosted by Japan, 
the Japanese government insisted that the Coast Guard play a 
more prominent role than the Navy in an apparent effort to 
emphasize the law enforcement aspects of the operation.59 Many 
members of the EU view the Bush Administration's 'War on 
Terror" as a grave mischaracterization of the enemy and how 
56. Id. 
57. See Japan & The E.U., Japan-EU Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non- 
proliferation (June 22, 2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external~relationdjap~summit 
13-22-06-04ldisarm.htm (assigning cooperation in the context of PSI as  a priority area). 
58. See EU-U.S. Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (June 26, 2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external~relations/udsumO6~O4d 
ecl-wmd.pdf. ( W e  fully subscribe to the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of 
Interdiction Principles and support efforts to interdict WMD shipments and enhance 
cooperation against proliferation networks, including in intelligence and law 
enforcement."). 
59. See Dr. James A Boutilier, Reflections on the New Zndo-Pacific Maritime and 
Naval Environment, POINTER (2004), available a t  http:Nwww.mindef.gov.sg/imindefl 
publications/pointer/journald2004v3On2/features/feature6.html. 
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best to neutralize it. Instead, they view the threats posed by A1 
Qaeda and other non-state actors as principally a criminal 
matter best dealt with by law enforcement authorities, not the 
military. So, while they have agreed to work with the United 
States to halt trafficking in WMD, they believe nonmilitary 
agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard should conduct its 
activities with the military playing supporting roles only as 
necessary. 
Third, the EU's statement is captioned "Non-proliferation" 
not "Counter-proliferation." The distinction between 
nonproliferation and counter-proliferation may be significant. 
The Initiative's architect, John Bolton, has correctly 
characterized the PSI as a "counter-proliferation" strategy, but 
in the end "nonproliferation" may prove more politically viable 
(if less accurateL6' The EU's characterization of the PSI as 
nonproliferation raises the concern that it may reveal an 
impulse to dilute the Initiative's military mission. Such an 
impulse should be resisted because the greatest strength of the 
PSI lies in the willingness of its supporters to use force if 
necessary to prevent proliferation. 
Another innovation of the PSI'S counter-proliferation regime 
is its focus on the weapons and materiel and not on the states. 
The PSI targets the weapons-not the parties interested in 
acquiring them. The source or intended recipients are legally 
and effectively significant but only insofar as certain intended 
recipients are privileged to receive WMD. When the maritime 
powers sought to end piracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, they did not destroy harbor cities such as New 
Orleans, Cartagena and Port-au-Prince that welcomed pirates. 
Instead, they hanged pirates. When Great Britain sought to end 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century, it did 
not embargo the United States, Brazil or ~uba." Instead it 
captured slave ships and returned their passenger-cargo to 
~ f r i c a . ~ ~  In this way, the PSI is less like an embargo or a war 
60. See John Bolton, An All-Out War on Proliferation, F I N .  TIMES, Sept. 7, 2004, 
available at http://www.state.govltJus/d36035.htm. 
61. Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of 
Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131,208 (2005). 
62. Id. 
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and more like a movement for the suppression of a vice. 
Consequently, it will help formulate a base norm that could 
eventually rise to the level of universal norms, much as the bans 
on piracy and slave trade did. The PSI does not appear to target 
states as an embargo or war would. Embargoes and wars must 
ultimately come to an end while universal norms endure. To 
construct a strong norm against proliferation, one should not 
look only to states for support. Also, the suppression of vice 
metaphor helps to explain in part the US.-EU split over how to 
characterize the challenge. The U.S. government views the PSI 
as part of a war on terror because of the military means 
necessary to implement it, while the EU mostly views it as a law 
enforcement issue because the enemy is not a state against 
which one declares war. The PSI may have achieved such 
widespread support in part because it need not characterize its 
actions as either war or law enforcement. 
Likewise, by targeting WMD rather than countries, the PSI 
creates a sanctions regime that has considerable advantages 
over embargoes and other counter-proliferation strategies. 
Because it specifically targets WMD, as well as materials used 
to construct them and the systems used to deliver them, it offers 
the prospect of an "exceptionally smart sanction." Traditional 
sanctions have become disfavored as tools of coercion. They 
overreach, preventing any goods from moving into a country or 
region, even necessities such as food, infant formula, or 
medicine. This lack of discrimination harms and alienates 
innocent people who have little or no ability to affect their 
government's behavior. So-called smart sanctions have similar 
shortcomings. They feed corruption and fail to alter the policy or 
behavior in question. An interdiction of WMD at sea would not 
constrain the flow of food, clean water, or medicine. 
Consequently, it does not lead to any collateral damage. 
Likewise, a specific interdiction does not threaten the health 
and safety of sailors on untargeted ships-those that are 
engaged in legitimate activities-unlike other maritime 
blockades. Also, it avoids the perils of smart sanctions because 
no new trading system is required; it creates no incentives or 
mechanisms for corruption. Although there is always the risk of 
mistakes, abuses, and the outbreak of war or other escalations of 
conflict, the PSI does appear to offer an almost perfectly 
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discriminating sanction. 
Another significant advantage of the PSI over more 
traditional nonproliferation regimes is that it was brought into 
being swiftly and can adapt deftly to  changing circumstances. 
Revising treaties to bring them into alignment with changed 
circumstances is at  best a lengthy process. On the other hand, 
the ability to adapt quickly means the level of enthusiasm or 
support may also change quickly; participants can drop out at  
virtually any time and for any reason. Participants are bound 
neither by custom nor by treaty-at least until a strong norm 
develops. Indeed, it will be interesting to see whether some 
mechanism evolves for ensuring signatories remain in the PSI 
and adhere to its principles even when doing so would be 
awkward, inconvenient, or perilous for a member or a 
nonmember participant. States may wish to  find ways to  bind 
themselves in order to insulate their governments from political 
pressures to defect. No doubt the Bush Administration has been 
frustrated by the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq 
following the attack bombings of March 11, 2004.~~ Hence the 
principal shortcoming of coalitions of the willing: the enemy can 
alter a coalition member's willingness to persist. The same can 
be said for many of the legacy, nonproliferation regimes. Export 
control regimes, for instance, are entirely voluntary in an 
international system in which state sovereignty is nearly 
sacrosanct; effective enforcement of security norms remains 
exceptionally difficult-in multilateral regimes as in coalitions 
of the willing. One way to reduce the freedom to defect would be 
for the strong states to sign agreements with longer termination 
periods or with obstacles such as binding arbitration. In the end, 
however, state sovereignty will always trump any such efforts. 
63. For a detailed account of the Madrid train attacks that occurred on March 11, 
2004, see Madrid Train Attacks, http:llnews.bbc.co.uWl/hi~inindepth/europd2OO4madrid 
- train-attacks/default.stm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
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B. National Security 
History will judge harshly those who saw this coming 
danger but failed to act. 
National Security Strategy of the United States of ~ m e r i c a ~ ~  
The integrity of the PSI, therefore, depends on the extent to 
which it promotes national interests. The U.S. commitment to 
the PSI is reflected in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America: 
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the 
crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies 
have openly declared that they are seeking [WMD], and 
evidence indicates that they are doing so with 
determination. The United States will not allow these 
efforts to succeed.. . . In the new world we have 
entered, the only path to peace and security is the path 
of action.65 
Likewise, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction-a document which is relatively thin on details or 
explanations about how such a strategy can be implemented- 
includes a statement about U.S. interests that lends credibility 
to the PSI. 'Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-nuclear, 
biological, and chemical-in the possession of hostile states and 
terrorists represent one of the great security challenges facing 
the United States . . . . We will not permit the world's most 
dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's 
most destructive weapons."66 While the strategy does promise to 
extend new international arrangements to support 
nonproliferation, it does not explicitly contemplate new 
arrangements to support counter-proliferation except to note 
that "WMD represent a threat not just to  the United States, but 
also to our friends and allies and the broader international 
64. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (20021, available at http://www.state.gov/documentdorganizatiodl5538.pdf 
65. Id. 
66. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newdreleases/2002ll2lWM 
DStrategy.pdf .  
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community. For this reason, it is vital that we work closely with 
like-minded countries on all elements of our comprehensive 
proliferation strategy."67 The national strategy's Manichaean use 
of the term "like-minded," however, undermines its credibility as 
an expression of U.S. interests. Peoples' minds change often. 
States do not possess minds. The United States would be better 
served by a document and a strategy premised on cooperation 
with those sharing our interests. in peace and security. Pakistan, 
Iran, and North Korea are not like-minded with the PSI'S 
supporters, but the United States and its allies should endeavor 
to  bring these states into the Initiative regardless of their 
mindset. 
Virtually all states share an interest in keeping WMD out of 
the hands of those who would use them. While the ultimate 
objective of the PSI is to halt the flow of WMD and those 
materials used to create them, merely making proliferation 
more difficult and expensive should reduce the threats these 
weapons pose. The PSI offers to do this by reducing the number 
of parties that have access to them and by reducing the number 
and lethality of such weapons that do get shipped. In light of the 
potential harms these weapons pose, the PSI need not be 
perfectly drafted or perfectly successful to be exceptionally 
valuable. Once a weapon of mass destruction is used, every 
effort to reduce the number and severity of subsequent attacks 
will seem even more urgent than preventing the first such 
attack appears today. 
111. HOW DOES THE PSI WORK? 
As articulated in the Statement of Interdiction Principles, 
the PSI adds three significant tools to the counter-proliferation 
kit.68 First, it increases the sharing of intelligence between 
participating states to track the flow of WMD, including the 
components and tools to  make them and the systems to deliver 
them. Second, it promotes increased operational cooperation 
among participating states to prepare for and plan to  interdict 
WMD if necessary. Third, it promulgates robust interdiction 
67. Id. 
68. STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 5. 
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principles that commit participants to use force if necessary to 
halt the flow of WMD. This subpart will discuss these tools in 
order. 
A. Intelligence Sharing and Operational Cooperation 
First, the Initiative's intelligence-sharing component has 
drawn widespread praise as a step in the right direction. Who is 
against breaking down the intelligence stovepipes to increase 
operational effectiveness? However, there exists precious little 
information on which to base a discussion about what, how, by 
whom, and with whom intelligence is shared. Instead, we are 
left with questions, some of which raise legal issues. Congress 
has not authorized the PSI or any funds for its a~tivities.~' 
Should legislation be amended to enable the U.S. Government to 
share intelligence with those lacking appropriate clearances or 
with states with which we do not generally share? Does any of 
this shared information violate domestic privacy laws, either in 
the United States, the European Union or elsewhere? Are 
suspected traffickers in WMD due any special process? For 
instance, what constitutes the reasonable suspicion standard for 
boarding a vessel? Presumably this suspicion can be based on 
secret information that the boarding party is unwilling to 
disclose, but where is this standard expressed? And as for the 
information shared, are there limitations on what can be shared 
or with whom? Must they be states? Can the United States 
share misinformation to test the integrity of those with whom it 
shares the information? 
Second, the Initiative's operational elements are not widely 
understood because they have not been widely reported. 
Elsewhere in this Article the various exercises are mentioned, 
but little detail is available to explain the operational elements 
of the PSI. Presumably, operational detail will only be available 
upon specific instances of interdictions. To date, attention has 
focused on the interdiction principals themselves. 
69. Robert Gard, Non-Proliferation Agenda for Congress: The FY 2005 Budget 
Process, CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION, Apr. 1, 2004, 
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/archivedOOO233.php. 
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B. Interdiction 
Third, the Initiative's most clearly articulated and 
contentious contribution is the commitment to interdict WMD 
shipments when necessary to prevent proliferation.70 To date, 
most of the attention has been on this ambitious tool. The need 
to develop such a mechanism drives the PSI. And while 
exercises and the few PSI operations have focused on 
interdiction at sea, these operations may eventually mean that 
armies enter sovereign and neutral countries to seize a 
shipment of WMD. The PSI'S institutional basis lies not in a 
charter or a treaty but in the Statement of Interdiction 
Principles signed by eleven countries in September 2003.~' This 
agreement commits signatories to interdict nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons and the delivery systems or materials 
used for making them as they move from or to "states or non- 
state actors of proliferation concern."72 
Determining what falls into the category of "materials used 
for making" weapons presents innumerable complications 
because most such materials are dual-use or because various 
countries may have vested interests in trading them. This sort of 
determination will ensure the PSI never becomes a clear-cut 
enterprise, nor is there any reason to believe it could or should 
be simple or easy. Indeed, if this type of determination were 
simple, then there would be no need for either the International 
Atomic Energy Agency or the World Trade Organization. 
Likewise, this kind of complexity explains in part why slaves are 
still traded and piracy is still committed in the twenty-first 
century. 
In an age of powerful distributed systems (that is, networks 
of desktop and laptop computers, rather than individual 
supercomputers), and in which the once near-complete 
dominance of the nation-state is giving way to a variety of 
entities with overlapping jurisdictions at multiple levels-for 
example, international, transnational, and regional 
70.  See STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 5 .  
71.  See generally SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 2 (2005). 
72. Id. at 6. 
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organizations; states, sub-states, multinational enterprises, and 
nongovernmental organizations; and an increased role for the 
individual-it seems logical that some important security 
functions should become more flexible and rely on distributed 
decision-making functions rather than state actors and the 
United Nations. In several important ways the U.N. Security 
Council, as envisioned by its 1945 Charter, was a model of mid- 
twentieth century structures with its highly-centralized, state- 
dominated decision-making apparatus. The PSI seems like a 
more appropriate decision-making apparatus for the twenty-first 
century. Its authority is diffused and opportunistic. The means 
at its disposal are more diverse, and the dichotomy between the 
law of war and the law of peace is blurred. 
IV. WHO SUPPORTS THE PSI AND WHAT ARE THEY DOING? 
As noted above, the PSI'S flexible design and lack of a formal 
organization make it difficult to evaluate the support it receives. 
In some instances, supporters and targets may even be the same 
if, for instance, Chechen separatists were to seek to  purchase a 
nuclear weapon. In that case, Russia is a supporter and a state 
of concern. This Part discusses the fluid nature of support for 
the PSI and what it is doing so far. 
A. Supporters and Participants 
Over seventy countries-constituting a majority of the 
world's maritime fleet and the vast preponderance of its naval 
might-are participating in the PSI at some There 
appear to be several categories of participants in the PSI. Each 
participant is a state. Core members are signatories to the 
Statement of Interdiction Principles, and each has a navy or 
other maritime defense force that could contribute substantially 
to an interdiction operation. Other states participate at various 
levels. At least five states that register significant shipping 
fleets have signed bilateral agreements to allow the United 
States to board ships in their fleet in order to halt WMD 
73.  See Mark T .  Esper & Charles A. Allen, The PSI: Taking Action Against WMD 
Proliferation, THE MONITOR 4 (2004), available at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf 
/monitor/monitor-sp_2004.pdf; see also U.S. Strategy to Combat WMD, supra note 48. 
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shipments.74 Other than the Statement of Interdiction Principles 
and these boarding agreements, the PSI has no charter or other 
foundation document. The PSI is neither an organization nor is 
it governed by a treaty. 
The participants include: Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as 
well as the United According to the State Department, 
dozens of other countries are participating in one way or 
another.76 And while a coalition of the willing may not be a 
particularly meaningful phrase when it comes to manning or  
supporting combat operations in Iraq, there may well come a 
day when the participation of Bulgaria or Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
the PSI'S activities does make a significant difference. 
Russia joined the PSI in May 2004--a signal moment in the 
Initiative's history in terms of increasing its legitimacy and 
effecti~eness.~~ Russia currently has some 8,000 nuclear 
warheads and the materials to assemble an estimated 80,000 
78 
more. Russia's arsenal is far and away the largest potential 
source of "loose nukes."79 Many of these weapons and materials 
are secured by nothing more than a padlock and an unarmed 
Russia's participation in any counter-proliferation effort 
is critical. Russia's signing on also facilitated passage of UNSCR 
1540. 
74. CHATHAM HOUSE, SHIP-BOARDING: AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE AGAINST 
TERRORISM AND WMD PROLIFERATION 1-2 (2005), http:/hvww.chathamhouse.org.uk/ 
pdflresearch/il/ILP241105.doc. 
75. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, supra note 1; see also Robert G. 
Joseph, Remarks to the Fletcher School Conf. on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Applying the Bush Administration's Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction to Today's Challenges (2005), http://www.state.gov/t/uslrml55601.htm. 
76. John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., Stopping the 
Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Role of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, Remarks at Tokyo America Center (Oct. 27, 20041, 
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37480.htm. 
77. Wade Boese, Russia Joins Proliferation Security Initiative, ARMS CONTROL 
TODAY, July-Aug. 2004, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/acV2004407-OWpsi.asp. 
78. Allison, supra note 44. 
79. RICHARD A. CLARK, ET AL., DEFEATING THE JIHADISTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR 
ACTION, 135--36, 141 (2004). 
80. Allison, supra note 44. 
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According to The Economist, China has "said a few kind 
words" about the PSI." China is the only member of the U.N. 
Security Council's permanent five members that has not signed 
82 
on. Unlike Russia, China does not appear to pose a significant 
risk as a source of loose nukes. While it has a significant nuclear 
arsenal, these weapons appear to be relatively well secured. For 
China, then, there are really two significant issues. First is the 
role China can play in bolstering or denying legality and 
legitimacy to the PSI. At the most obvious level, with China's 
support, the U.N. Security Council could pass a resolution that 
would explicitly authorize the use of all necessary means to halt 
the proliferation of WMD-a "super" Resolution 1540 that would 
alleviate any concern about the PSI'S legality. The second issue 
arises out of China's role as the principal patron of North Korea. 
Without China's protection, North Korea's government would 
face the full force of the international community. It seems, 
however, that absent the emergence of a new threat to China 
from a non-state entity with access to WMD, the People's 
Republic will not fully endorse the PSI. 
India and Pakistan have both been declared nuclear powers 
since their respective 1998 tests of nuclear weapons.83 Neither 
had signed the NPT, so no legal obligations were violated. While 
India has not yet joined the PSI, it appears to be laying the 
groundwork for doing so by constructing a series of sensors 
designed to detect the passage of nuclear materials near its vast 
~oastline.'~ Given the historical tensions with its neighbor 
81. Dealing with North Korea, Again: When the partying has to stop, T m  
ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, at 39,40. But see William Hawkins, Hu's Running the Show?, 
NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 12,2005, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/commen 
t/hawkins200509120808.asp (claiming that China eviscerated UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540's support for the PSI); Edward Lanfranco, China won't sign on to PSI, 
WASH.TIMES, ept. 2, 2005 (citing China's concerns about the legality of interdictions). 
82. See Wade Boese, The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) at a Glance, ARMS 
CONTROL ASS'N, Sept. 2005, http~/m.armscontrol.org/factsheets/psi.asp. 
83. Michael L. Feeley, Note, Apocalypse Now? Resolving India's and Pakistan's 
Testing Crisis, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 777, 777 (2000). 
84. See Guarding Against Shipments of WMDs, FIN. EXPRESS, Jan. 31, 2005; see 
generally India Soon to Join A US-Led Security Group, INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 30, 2005 
(referring to PSI as more politically sensitive than another US.-led initiative, the 
Container Security Initiative). 
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Pakistan, and the fact that A.Q. Khan, Pakistan's leading 
nuclear scientist, has already exported atomic weapons and the 
tools and materials to fabricate them, it seems only a matter of 
time before India joins the  PSI.^^ Possible Indian concerns that 
Pakistan will be given a free pass by the PSI may be causing it 
to withhold its participation until it is assured that Pakistan 
will be included in any list of states of concern.86 At the same 
time, India has expressed some misgivings it shares with 
Pakistan about the legitimacy of UNSCR 1540's imposition of 
obligations on countries that do not have a vote in the Security 
Perhaps President Bush's recent decision to allow 
- 
India to export peaceful nuclear materials will encourage India 
to sign on.'' 
Pakistan presents a more complex story in great part 
because of its inability to control its own nuclear materials. 
When news broke that A.Q. Khan was at the center of a 
transnational trading network and that he had made numerous 
trips to Pyongyang, the government of Pervez Musharraf 
averred that it was unaware of and had no control over the deals 
being s t r~ck . '~  This lack of control is troubling-more than the 
kind of control Pyongyang exerts over its own subjects' ability to 
export WMD. 
The PSI activities consist of meetings, exercises, efforts 
toward planning or sharing information, and any interdictions 
that eventuate. PSI exercises are the most visible display of the 
85. MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI, Q. 2543 PROLIFERATION 
SECURITY INITIATIVE (2005), http://meaindia.nic.in~par1iament/rs/2005/03/24rs30.htm 
(stating "[tlhere has been no formal invitation to India to join the PSI so farn). 
86. Premvir Das, PSI From a n  Indian Perspective, in 4 CSIS ISSUES & INSIGHTS, a t  
32 ,3344 ,  July 2004, available a t  http~/'~~~.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ 
v04n05%5B1%5D.pdf (citing a concern that PSI might not be lawful). 
87. Siddharth Varadarajan, India, Pak Join Forces Against US Move, TIMES OF 
INDIA, Apr. 23, 2004, available a t  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com~articleshow/ 
636138.cms 
88. The Bush Administration's Non-Proliferation Policy: Successes and  Future 
Challenges (2004) (testimony of John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y of Arms Control and Int'l 
Sec., Before the House Int'l Rel. Comm.), available a t  http://www.state.g0v/t/us/rm/31029 
.htm. 
89. Implication of U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Cooperation, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(testimony of Ashton B. Carter, Co-Dir., Preventive Defense Project, Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Senate Foreign Relations). 
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Initiative's work-short of the actual interdictions. At least nine 
meetings have also been held." According to the State 
Department, "dozens of countries have participated in or 
observed a t  least one of the PSI interdiction  exercise^."'^ As of 
spring 2004, the PSI participants had completed four maritime 
(in the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the Arabian Sea), and 
one air interception exercise (over Italy) as well as one tabletop 
air interception exerci~e.'~ In August 2005, a fifth maritime 
exercise dubbed Deep Sabre was held in the neighborhood of 
~ i n ~ a ~ o r e . ' ~  
B. Early Successes? 
Beyond these exercises, the PSI supporters claim that two 
actual interdictions have already contributed significantly to the 
promotion of peace and security. Most notably, John Bolton 
claimed that the "interception, in cooperation with the U.K., 
Germany, and Italy, of the BBC China, a vessel loaded with 
nuclear-related components, helped convince Libya that the 
days of undisturbed accumulation of WMD were over, and 
helped unravel A.Q. Khan's net~ork." '~ While Mr. Bolton's claim 
may gloss over a number of details that would tell a more 
nuanced story, the fact is that Libya is moving with great speed 
90. Henry J. Cordes, 19 Nations Hold Talks in Omaha on WMD Spread, OMAHA 
WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 27,2005, a t  B3; note 141, a t  2. 
91. BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES 
INITIATIVES TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION, May 2, 2005, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/oth 
erl45456.htm. 
92. Esper & Allen, supra note 73. The authors are respectively Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy and Deputy General Counsel for 
International M a i r s  in the U.S. Dep't of Defense. THE MONITOR is a publication of the 
Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia. This issue was 
dedicated to a survey of the PSI. 
93. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SINGAPORE HOSTS MULTINATIONAL MARITIME 
INTERDICTION EXERCISE (2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2005/Aug/15-878756. 
html. 
94. Bolton, supra note 60. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has announced that  
the PSI was "responsible for 11 interdictions." SQUASSONI, supra note 71, a t  3. The issue 
of whether this operation should be attributed to the PSI remains controversial; the 
State Department is now backing off this claim. Wade Boese, Letter to the Editor, False 
Claims of PSI Success, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at A16. 
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to conform to international norms,95 and Dr. Khan is out of 
business. Any contribution made by the PSI to these significant 
steps should be highly encouraging. In light of such successes, 
one might wonder why the PSI was not launched years ago. The 
answer to such a question may be revealed in a discussion of the 
political and legal obstacles it faces. 
The supporters of PSI must contend with the fact that a ship 
flying the flag of one state on the high seas is generally immune 
from interference by forces of another state.96 This basic 
principle underlies much of international law and poses 
significant issues for those seeking to  justify a nonpermissive 
interdiction on the high seas.. 
A. Freedom of the Seas 
The first principle of maritime law remains that ships flying 
the flag of one country are immune to the jurisdiction of 
another.97 This base norm of international law is subject to 
several important exceptions developed through custom and 
treaty over the cent~ries.~' However, should any reader find this 
rule quaint or antiquated, she should recall that throughout 
history boarding another country's ships without legal 
justification has been deemed an act of war and responded to in 
kind." The 1731 boarding of,the English ship Rebecca, and the 
severing of Captain Robert Jenkins' ear, sparked general war in 
Europe. Likewise, the British embargo of Napoleonic Europe 
earned it unintentional enemies: the United States entered into 
a side war in 1812, principally to defend freedom of the seas. A 
leading scholar of the subject notes: 
95. See Gawdat Bahgat, Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East, 4 J. OF SOC., 
POL., AND ECON. STUD. ¶4 (2005). 
96. For a valuable history of this principle and the wider context, see John W. 
Coogan, THE END OF NEUTRALITY: THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND MARITIME RIGHTS, 
1899-1915, at 17 (Cornell Univ. Press 1981). 
97. Id. 
98. See generally id. at 17-29. 
99. Id. at 17,31. 
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If the world wars of 1793-1815 established one legal 
principle beyond challenge, it was that neither 
belligerents nor neutrals could dictate maritime law. 
Future law, like past law, would be shaped by 
belligerents and neutrals balancing contradictory 
interests on the seas against the political and strategic 
implications of possible policies.100 
B. Exceptions to Freedom of the Seas 
Sensitive to the importance of freedom of the seas, President 
John F. Kennedy meticulously crafted the "quarantine" of Cuba 
in October 1962 and had the Organization of American States 
authorize it in order to minimize the risk that the Soviet Union 
would view the seizure of ships as an act of war.''' The same 
concern remains very much alive today. Shortly after the 
launching of the PSI, North Korea described it "as a 'brigandish 
naval blockade' akin to 'terrorism in the sea and a gross 
violation of international law.' The official daily Rondong 
Sinmun proclaimed, 'nobody can vouch that this blockade 
operation will not lead to such a serious development as an all- 
out Notably, North Korea does not have a significant 
100. Coogan, supra note 96, a t  20. 
101. Becker, supra note 61, at 215. 
102. See Rebecca Weiner, Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD 
Matkriel, CENTER FOR NON-PROLIFERATION STUDIES, July 16, 2003, available a t  
http://cns.miis.edufpubslweeW030716.htm (citing to Samantha Maiden, THE 
ADVERTISER, July 14, 2003, and Nicholas Kralev, U.S. Seeks Asian Aid for Ship 
Searches, WASH. TIMES, (June 17, 2003). While I cannot read Korean, I would be very 
interested to know who translated the Korean characterizations, particularly the word 
"brigand." 
Intriguingly, Selig S. Harrison has recently called into question whether North Korea is 
actually developing a program to enrich uranium to weapons grade-a question already 
settled in the court of public opinion: 
Much has been written about the North Korean nuclear danger, but one 
crucial issue has been ignored: just how much credible evidence is there to 
back up Washington's uranium accusation? Although it is now widely 
recognized that the Bush Administration misrepresented and distorted the 
intelligence data i t  used to justify the invasion of Iraq, most observers have 
accepted a t  face value the assessments that the Administration has used to 
reverse the previously established U.S. policy toward North Korea. 
Selig S. Harrison, Did North Korea Cheat, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2005, a t  99, available 
a t  http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2005010lfaessay84109/selig-s-ha~son~did-north-korea- 
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naval force that could somehow retaliate in kind were a PSI 
member to interdict one of its otherwise lawful shipments. This 
inability to respond proportionately could actually backfire and 
trigger general war on the Korean Peninsula. If the United 
States wishes to gain legitimacy for the PSI as a multilateral 
initiative, it must strive for "both wider international 
participation and institutional safeguards to restrain its own 
power."103 Until then, states such as North Korea will be able to 
denounce the PSI as an arbitrary tool for powerful states to 
wield unilaterally against weaker states. 
While unilateral action can radically destabilize 
international relations, instability is sometimes necessary to 
develop a humane new norm. The United States and its original 
PSI have taken an appropriate first step and can now guide the 
cheat.htm1 (arguing that the Administration has exaggerated intelligence that  may only 
prove lower levels of enrichment that are permitted under the NPT). If North Korea is 
not capable of exporting WMD, then PSI does not have much of a purpose. Unfortunately 
for Harrison's thesis, however, North Korea's government acknowledged its nuclear 
weapons program in February 2005. Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, North 
Korea's Nuclear Program, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, M a y J u n e  2005, a t  64, available at 
http://www.thebulletin.org/article~nn.php?artrtoh=mj05no~s. This claim could be 
fraudulent and intended to secure, for North Korea, the deterrence that  such a program 
would provide. 
On the other hand, most analysts accept the North Korean government's word (and that 
of the U.S. Government) on this subject. Brookings Scholar Michael O'Hanlon, for 
instance, takes Korean nuclear weapons as a given and expresses concern that "the 
economic pressures that help motivate North Korea's arms sales, counterfeiting, and 
drug smuggling remain powerful." Michael O'Hanlon, The North Korean Nuclear Threat, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 1, 2005, at  B12, available at https://www.brookings.edu/ 
views/articles/ohanlon~20050401.htm. 
Likewise, journalist Tomas Friedman argues: 
North Korea's nuclear program could be stopped tomorrow by the country 
that  provides roughly half of North Korea's energy and one-third of its food 
supplies-and that is China. All China has to say to Kim Jong I1 is: You will 
shut down your nuclear weapons program and put all your reactors under 
international inspection, or we will turn off your lights, cut off your heat and 
put your whole country on a diet. Have we made ourselves clear? One thing 
we know about China-it knows how to play hardball when i t  wants to, and 
if China played hardball that way with North Korea, the proliferation threat 
from Pyongyang would be over. 
Thomas L. Friedman, Brussels Sprouts, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at A19. In fact, 
Beijing tolerates the North Korean weapons program. 
103. Becker, supra note 61, a t  221. 
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Initiative's enlargement. In the early nineteenth century, 
hegemonic Britain was the first state to take bold and 
destabilizing steps to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade.lo4 Over 
the years that followed, Britain was able to transform this moral 
preference into a universal norm. The impulse to end 
proliferation, however, faces two obstacles that the opposition to 
slave trade never had to address. First, as noted above, today's 
robust system of international law strongly favors 
noninterference in other states' affairs and freedom of the 
105 
seas. Second, also noted above, it seeks to implement change 
in the long-standing and comprehensive global political system 
in which each state has equal status. Britain's unilateral policy 
to halt the slave trade was developed at a time when the legal, 
political, and military systems governing international relations 
were inchoate.lo6 For the PSI to gain effectiveness today, its 
actions must be grounded in international law and minimize its 
destabilizing effects. 
The significance of an interdiction of WMD depends on 
where the acts take place. For interdictions at sea, this depends 
in turn on the vessel's location and the flag it flies. The location 
presents the first threshold issue. There are three categories of 
waters in which a vessel might be found. First, a country's 
"territorial sea" includes its ports and harbors and extends 
twelve miles out from the coast.lo7 Within its territorial seas, a 
state's authority is at its zenith. Second, a maritime state's 
"contiguous zone" extends out across the next twelve miles of 
108 
ocean. Within this zone, states may police waters for customs, 
immigration and sanitation laws.log Third, on the high seas, no 
104. See Lee A. Casey & David B.  Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitmacy: The Rome 
Statute's Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 63,69 (2003). 
105. Cf: Coogan, supra note 96, at 31,32. 
106. See Patricia M. Muhammad, Esq., The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A 
Forgotten Crime Against Humanity as Defined by International Law, 19 AM. U .  INm L. 
REV. 883,930 (2004). 
107. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, arts. 2-3, 11, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.  
Doc. NConf. 621122, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter 
UNCLOS]. 
108. Id. art. 33. 
109. See Joel A. Doolin, OPERATIONAL ART FOR THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY 
INITIATIVE 4 (May 3,2004) (unpublished student paper, Naval War College), available at 
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one has authority over vessels flying the flag of another state 
except as discussed be10w.l'~ 
In the territorial sea area of a state-up to approximately 
twelve miles from the coastline-foreign ships in so-called 
innocent passage are generally presumed exempt from boarding 
or seizures.'" A government may search and seize a vessel found 
within its own territorial waters, subject only to 1) a reasonable 
claim that such vessel's transit is "prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State" and to 2) any domestic law 
constraints, such as criminal procedure, due process, unlawful 
searches, and takings.''' If either of these conditions is met, then 
the coastal state may board a ship or permit another state to do 
so. With permission or even pre-authorization from the 
government of the state in whose territorial waters the ship is 
sailing, another power may search and even seize that vessel. 
For example, Kuwait and the Emirates could give the policing 
powers permission to board the ships of smugglers, pirates, and 
other miscreants sailing within twelve miles of their coastlines 
in the Persian Gulf. While suspicious vessels would quickly 
learn of this possibility, their course adjustments to avoid these 
waters might give the United States additional insights about 
which ships to track. While this information may not lead to an 
immediate interdiction, it might prove useful at a later date. It 
would also raise additional obstacles and thus the costs of 
trafficking in WMD. 
The first of these conditions-a claim that the ship poses a 
threat to safety or security--can readily be overcome if the state 
credibly claims that a vessel is carrying WMD. Article 19 of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) defines innocent passage: 
(1) Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to 
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. 
Such passage shall take place in conformity with this 
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/doolin.pdf. Also extending 188 miles beyond the twelve- 
mile limits of the territorial seas is an exclusive economic zone. Id. a t  17. 
110. Coogan, supra note 96, a t  17. 
111. UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 17. 
112. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 19 ("Passage is innocent so long as  i t  is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state."). 
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Convention and with other rules of international law. 
(2) Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of 
the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of the coastal State, or in any other 
manner in violation of the principles of international 
law embodied in the [I9451 Charter of the United 
~ations."ll~ 
Article 21  continues to permit 
[tlhe coastal State [to] adopt laws and regulations, in 
conformity with the provisions of this Convention and 
other rules of international law, relating to innocent 
passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or 
any of the following: (a) the safety of navigation and the 
regulation of maritime traffic; . . . (d) the conservation 
of the living resources of the sea; . . . (f) the preservation 
of the environment of the coastal State and the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
thereof; . . . [or] (h) the prevention of infringement of 
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations of the coastal state.l14 
While none seem to be precisely on point in the abstract, in 
actuality, a state should have no difficulty shoehorning the 
threat of WMD into one of these justifications. 
In the contiguous zones-extending generally twelve miles 
out from the territorial seas-a state may "exercise the control 
necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its 
territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above 
laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial 
sea."'15 Once again, lawyers will likely find justifications for 
boarding a ship carrying WMD in the contiguous zone of their 
state. 
On the other hand, stopping, boarding, or seizing a ship on 
113. Id. 
114. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 21. 
115. UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 33. 
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the high seas that is suspected of carrying WMD presents a 
variety of thorny issues. As the UNCLOS"~ explicitly notes, "The 
high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid 
down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. 
It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: 
,3117 (a) freedom of navigation . . . . There are notable exceptions to 
the general rule of freedom of navigation. First of all, the 
captain or the owner of a ship can waive it. There may be 
instances when that permission could be secured; for instance, 
when the boarding party notifies the owner or captain that the 
ship is suspected of carrying contraband. The boarding party 
may board the ship by surprise or the owner or captain may 
voluntarily submit his ship to boarding so as to avoid the 
consequences of incurring the boarding party's displeasure. 
Likewise, permission to interdict could be secured from 
appropriate authorities of the government that have registered 
the ship. Interdiction is also permissible where reasonable 
grounds exist to suspect"8 a ship of ~tatelessness,~'~ engaging in 
slave trade,lZ0 shipping narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
sub~tances,'~' committing unauthorized broadcasting,'22 or 
The legal test for seizure is higher. 
Indeed, it was an event such as this that triggered the 
formation of the PSI. Acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence, 
Spanish special forces boarded a North Korean vessel, the So 
116. The United States is among the few nations not party to this convention, but 
it is bound by many of its provisions to the extent that they codify customary 
international law or that i t  is a party to other relevant treaties. Jack I. Gamey, The 
International Institution Imperative for Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Assessing the Proliferation Security Initiative, 10 J .  OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 
125, 147 n.27 (2005). 
117. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 87. 
118. The reasonable ground to suspect standard for establishing a right to visit is 
found in UNCLOS, Art. 110. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 110. 
119. See id. art. 92. 
120. See id. art. 99. 
121. See id. art. 108. 
122. See id. art. 109. 
123. See id. arts. 100-10 (Piracy is defined clearly and narrowly and cannot easily 
be read to include acts that would put WMD in the hands of non-state actors or other 
entities that should not have them). 
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Sun, on the high seas in 2002.'~~ They were justified in doing so 
because the So Sun was flying different flags and otherwise 
masking its state.'25 However, once the Spanish determined that 
the So Sun was carrying Scud missiles to Yemen and that there 
was no legal justification for keeping these missiles from 
Yemen's government, the Spaniards were obliged to let the So 
Sun continue its voyage and deliver the 
The characterization of certain actors as pirates and certain 
terrorist acts as piracy presents a couple of intriguing 
possibilities for punishing or preventing future acts of terrorism. 
Professor Ruth Wedgwood labeled A1 Qaeda a pirate 
organization and the attacks of 9/11 piracy, concluding that 
members of Osama Bin Laden's network were enemies of 
ci~ilization.'~~ While Professor Wedgwood's thesis was not 
universally accepted, it retains considerable heuristic value and 
may provide a roadmap for building support for the policing of 
those who engage in terrorist acts. At the level of a plain 
language interpretation, it is, however, incorrect in light of the 
UNCLOS's narrow and explicit definition of piracy.'28 Likewise, 
her definition is not particularly useful when seeking to 
interdict WMD at sea because either a vessel does or does not 
have the protection of a state. If it has that protection, then it 
cannot be labeled a pirate ship. 
If a vessel has no state protection, international law offers 
no protection other than the dictates of universal human rights. 
One way to make use of piracy laws, along with universal 
jurisdiction, lies in getting every state to renounce any 
organization that uses or threatens to use violence against 
civilian noncombatants. The same sort of step was taken in the 
Paris Declaration of 1856 when the major maritime powers 
forever renounced privateering and effectively made piracy a 
124. See Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the 
Legal Challenges, 14 J .  TRANSNAT'L . & POL'Y 253,253 (2005). 
125. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 92 
126. Logan, supra note 124, at 263-54. 
127. See Ruth Wedgwood, Agora: Military Commissions: A1 Qaeda, Terrorism, and 
Military Commissions, 96 AM.  J .  INT'L L. 328, 329 (2002). 
128. See UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 100-10. 
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universal crime.12' The challenge of building universal consensus 
has prevented the U.N. Security Council from defining terrorism 
and will probably prevent the building of consensus for labeling 
WMD trafficking as piracy. On the other hand, the Security 
Council already has the authority to permit interdictions of 
WMD on the high seas. The Security Council could simply pass 
a resolution authorizing all necessary means to staunch the flow 
of WMD-an option it failed to exercise when it passed UNSCR 
1540. 
C. Interdiction as Self-Defense 
Short of an explicit U.N. Security Council Resolution, there 
are other legal arguments to support interdictions. The 1945 
Charter itself seeks not to ban the use of force but merely to 
"ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of 
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest. . . ."130 It goes on to acknowledge that "[nlothing in the 
129. See Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden: How Thinking of 
Terrorists as Pirates Can Help Win the War on Terror, LEGAL AFF., JulyIAug. 2005, 
available a t  http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2OO5/feature~burgess~ 
julaug05.msp. Burgess unfortunately seems to think that the problem is as simple as  
getting all states to agree that something called terrorism is akin to piracy and should be 
banned. He seems oblivious to the difficulty states have in defining terrorism and that 
states support these acts because they believe the acts to be in their interest. In 1856, 
the United States actually refused to accept the Declaration of Paris formally because i t  
was unready to forswear privateering. See Coogan, supra note 96, a t  22. Customary 
international law quickly developed on this matter as the U.S. government renounced 
privateers once and for all during the Civil War when the Confederate states used this 
tool of war to great effect. In its opposition to the Confederacy's privateers, the U.S. 
government gave up its claim to persistent and unambiguous objections to the new norm 
against privateers. Customary international law progressed apace unimpeded by 
American constraints. The evolution of technology helped in this process as  ships of war 
became increasingly expensive and specialized. I t  no longer made sense for commercial 
ships to pick up a few cannons and join a war effort. The guns grew too large for 
retrofitting and were of little use without armor plating the walls of a ship. For more on 
the technological transformations of this era, see MARK R. SHULMAN, NAVALISM AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN SEA POWER, 1882-1893 (1995). 
Coincidently, Paris is also where the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles was 
originally announced. John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec. 
Affairs, Remarks a t  Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting (Sept. 4, 2003), 
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm. 
130. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added). 
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present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations . . . ."131 The definition of those 
principles and methods as well as the significance of this 
inherent right remains contested. 
Perhaps the inherent right includes a right to launch 
preventive war under some circumstances. The doctrine of 
preventive war remains an arrow in the quiver of U.S. national 
security strategy. But as a matter of operational reality, it 
appears to have been exhausted-at least for now. The failure to 
find WMD in Iraq, the lack of broad support for the U.S.-led war 
in Iraq, and the serious drain on resources imposed by the on- 
going operations in Afghanistan and Iraq makes preventive war 
extremely unlikely in the near future. The prospect of a 
preventive war may re-emerge at some late date, but it appears 
to have no more political legitimacy than it would have had prior 
to 9/11. In light of the embarrassing failure to locate WMD, it 
seems unlikely that preventive war will develop the political 
support necessary to help promote the tenuous legal argument. 
On the other hand, efforts to legitimate a preventative seizure of 
a shipment of previously identified WMD would not face such 
high hurdles. 
The use of force under the PSI may or may not fall under the 
classical definition of anticipatory self-defense, depending on the 
circumstances and facts.13' As a basis for the use of force, the 
justification for self-defense has traditionally been judged by the 
rule of the Caroline: the use of force in anticipation of an attack 
is constrained by proportionality and by a requirement that the 
threat "leav[es] no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberati~n."'~~ Surely, anticipatory self-defense would justify 
U.S. destruction of a North Korean naval vessel carrying 
nuclear tipped missiles toward San Francisco, even absent a 
131. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
132. See Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security 
Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 526, 541 (2004). 
133. Letter, with enclosures, from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (July 27, 
1842) (compiled by the Avalon Project at Yale Law School), available at 
http://www.yale.ed~awweb/avalon/diplomacymritia~r-1842d.htm (giving context and 
correspondence surrounding this seminal exchange). 
Heinonline - -  28 Hous. J. Int'l L. 812 2006 
20061 PROLIFERATION SECURITY INTIA TIVE 8 13 
declaration of war. Short of that clear-cut case, however, 
anticipatory self-defense may not legitimate an interdiction on 
the high seas. 
D. Boarding Agreements 
Many merchant ships fly flags of convenience to avoid taxes, 
laws regulating work conditions of their crew, or environmental 
regulations, or any combination thereof. Some small states 
register these ships for small sums that add up to a significant 
revenue stream. Even though they were selected based on the 
implied promise that they will not inconvenience ship owners, 
these states retain the legal authority to board ships carrying 
their flags.134 Moreover, they are able to delegate all of their 
authority if they wish. To date, five leading flag states have 
signed boarding agreements, including ~ i b e r i a ' ~ ~  and 
As a consequence, a large portion of the global merchant fleet is 
flagged by states that either support the PSI or have signed 
boarding agreements. More than half the world's shipping fleet, 
by weight, is liable to boarding with minimal 0bstac1es.l~~ 
Interdiction of WMD aboard these vessels no longer presents 
serious legal obstacles. 
One should pause to note the tremendous feat of diplomacy 
that has given the PSI members legal authority to board any of 
134. UNCLOS, supra note 107, at 94, 217 
135. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Liberia Concerning Cooperation To Suppress the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related 
Materials by Sea, US.-Liber., Feb. 11, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32403.htm. 
136. Amendment to the Supplementary Arrangement Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama to the 
Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Panama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast Guard 
for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice, US.-Pan., 
May 12, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32858.htm. As of July 25, 2005, five 
countries have signed ship-boarding agreements with the United States in conjunction 
with the PSI. Cyprus was the fifth country to sign a ship-boarding agreement; previous 
agreements have been concluded with Liberia, Panama, the Marshall Islands, and 
Croatia. Media Note, U.S. Dep't of State, The United States and the Republic of Cyprus 
Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement (July 25, 20051, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/50035.htm. 
137. Becker, supra note 61, a t  182; see generally Doolin, supra note 109, at 5. 
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thousands of ships. If finding WMD is like searching for needles 
in a haystack, it is worth noting that the PSI members may now 
X-ray large portions of that haystack. The timid might demur at 
the level of persuasion that may have been applied in order to 
obtain signatures on these boarding agreements, but no one has 
claimed Liberia and Panama signed under duress. Such a claim 
might have the effect of nullifjrlng the agreements.13' 
This situation also raises the interesting issue as to whether 
one state can simply purchase some of another state's rights. 
International law does not specifically disallow the purchase 
from a state of the right to board a vessel bearing its flag. So 
what is to  stop South Korea from offering to purchase this right 
from North Korea in exchange for a steady supply of food and 
energy? For those trying to figure out how the fifty-year war in 
Korea might end in a whimper rather than in a bang, this could 
present an intriguing possibility. Likewise, what is to keep the 
United States from making boarding permission a condition of 
continued participation in regional security or even free trade 
areas? 
E. Strengthening the PSI'S Legitimacy 
A political scientist may question why the PSI should seek 
legal authority in the first place. After all, laws are not death 
pacts, and the consequences of WMD falling into the hands of a 
terrorist organization are unfathomable. Moreover, even leading 
international rule of law jurists recognize that "a violation of the 
law is not necessarily always deplorable and may even be a good 
thing."13' The response, of course, is that by bringing the law in 
accord with policy, one continues to support a system of laws- 
one which generally benefits those seeking to maintain peace 
and security. 
More formal and traditional initiatives to  permit 
interdictions are also being pursued. Along with the United 
138. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 52, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, available at h t t p : / / u n t r e a t y . u n . o r g / i l d t e x t s l i n s t ~ e n t i o n  
dl-1-1969.pdf hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
139. Thomas M. Franck, Humanitarian and Other Interventions, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAPL . 321,325 (2005). 
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States, the London-based International Maritime Organization 
has proposed amending the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation to criminalize the illegal proliferation of WMD at 
140 
sea. This laudable effort may succeed but only to the extent of 
permitting boarding or interdiction upon flag state consent. 
What proliferating state will voluntarily give up this right? Each 
of these PSI agreements is shrinking the sphere of freedom in 
which proliferation can occur. At the present rate of progress, 
that space may eventually become so small that world opinion 
considers counter-proliferation to be a base norm. This shift 
would make it much easier for the United States or "like-minded 
countries" to seek a specific resolution of the Security Council to 
target the ships of one rogue state. Making a similar argument, 
the Bush Administration has cited the Security Council 
Presidential Statement of 1992 as authority for such 
interdictions.14' The Security Council itself did likewise when 
passing UNSCR 1540. But the value of the Presidential 
Statement is debatable and highlights the fact that much work 
remains to establish the authority to interdict WMD at sea. 
On the other hand, if the PSI does signal a move away from 
centralized decision-making on issues related to international 
peace and security, then it may be more worthwhile to pursue 
regional arrangements rather than a global solution. Article 52 
of the 1945 U.N. Charter preserves the right of regional 
organizations or arrangements to deal with the maintenance of 
international peace and security as appropriate for regional 
action such as that performed by NATO.'~~ So a regional security 
organization, acting with the specific authorization of each state 
in the region, might declare a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) and 
request that the Security Council help enforce it. The Security 
Council could in turn pass a resolution pursuant to its authority 
under Chapter VII of the Charter to authorize the use of all 
necessary means to enforce the regional ban on WMD. '~~ Or, 
states in a given region could act without explicit resolution, 
140. See Esper & Allen, supra note 73, at 5. 
141. See Prosser & Scoville, supra note 21. 
142. U.N. Charter art. 52. 
143. Id. art. 40. 
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supported by the claim that they retain the right to do so, much 
as NATO did in 1999 to  prevent genocide in ~ o s o v o . ' ~ ~  Lately 
some states have been working to establish an NFZ throughout 
the entire southern hemisphere. The United States, Great 
Britain, and France have consistently blocked such efforts in 
order to ensure that their own nuclear forces remain 
~nencumbered.'~~ What would happen if the Security Council 
were able to establish such an NFZ in which it could license 
certain states to carry nuclear weapons or other WMD under 
certain circumstances? Even in states that ban individual 
ownership of guns, law enforcement officers are permitted to 
carry them. Such a system would allow the nuclear states to 
have their proverbial cake (WMD), and eat it too (refuse WMD 
to others). 
The United States is already pursuing a different and yet 
equally innovative regional policy. Pacific Command's (PACOM) 
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) is building a 
"coalition of the willing" to counter transnational threats, 
including terrorism, maritime piracy, illegal traffic in narcotics, 
weapons, humans, and illicit cargo and other criminal activities 
in the Asia-Pacific region.146 The overall goal is to  develop a 
partnership of willing nations who work together "to identify, 
monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under 
international and domestic law."147 By increasing the range of 
states and organizations participating in this initiative and by 
expanding the scope of activities it undertakes, the United 
States appears to be creating the structure upon which the PSI 
can be implemented. Given the vast portion of the world within 
PACOM's purview-stretching fiom the littorals of the Indian 
144. William H. TaR, IV, Symposium Remark "The United States and 
International Law: Confronting Global Challenges," 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 659,661 (2005). 
145. Indeed, these and other powers have also worked to  preserve the right of  
unfettered transit o f  nuclear materials through the high seas and Exclusive Economic 
Zones o f  coastal states. See ChaEee, supra note 33. 
146. See RMSZ, supra note 39; see also Toshi Yoshihara & James Holmes, Islands 
Only Look Peaceful; Japan Needs U.S. to Anchor Territorial Tug-of-war With China, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 18, 2005, at A19. 
147. Admiral Tom Fargo, USN Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Address at 
Military Operations and Law Conference, (May 3,2001), http://131.84.1.218/speeches/sst 
2004/040503milops.shtml; see also RMSZ, supra note 39. 
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Ocean through the South Pacific and as far north as the Bering 
Sea-the ambition is breathtaking. It is one thing for 
Washington to issue a directive with global scope. It is entirely 
another to develop operational capacity to implement it in 
dozens of countries and nearly one-hundred million square miles 
of earth and sea.'*' U.S. PACOM is undertaking cooperative 
efforts with regional partners to increase situational awareness 
and information sharing, to develop responsive decision-making 
architecture within the region, to enhance maritime interception 
capacity, and to increase agency, ministerial, and international 
cooperation.149 Little information is publicly available with 
which to evaluate the RMSI's progress in these laudable efforts. 
Yet it seems noteworthy that a military commander-not a 
professional diplomat-is taking the lead on this important 
multilateral diplomatic initiative.l5' While the RMSI's official 
strategy paper mentions the PSI only as one of a number of 
"cooperative security activities" it "complements," the RMSI 
appears to be the principal mechanism through which the 
United States is institutionalizing the PSI agenda.151 At the 
same time, it offers an innovative next step. One of its stated 
objectives is to "develop seamless partnerships between 
governments and the private sector to balance maritime safety 
and security with free trade."152 As such it echoes other U.S. 
initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative and the 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism in their efforts to 
bridge the divides between the government and the private 
~ec t0 r . l~~  
148. See Yoshihara & Holmes, supra note 146, at  A19; see also Naval 
Meteorology and Oceanography Command Homepage, Oceans of the World, 
http://pao.cnmoc.navy.mil/pao/Educate/Ocndexoceans.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 
2006). 
149. Tom Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Speech a t  the Military 
Operations and Law Conference, Victoria, British Columbia (May 3, 2004), 
http://www.pacom.miVspeeches/sst2004040503mi1ops.shtm1. 
150. See generally U.S. Pacific Command, http://www.pacom.mil (containing 
various documents and reports on RMSI) (last visited Apr. 2,2006). 
151. U.S. Pacific Command, RMSZ, supra note 39, a t  13. 
152. Id. a t  7. 
153. In January 2002, the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection 
announced the creation of the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Through the CSI 
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It will be fascinating to watch how U.S. PACOM handles a 
public-private partnership. It will also be interesting to see how 
various agencies of the U.S. government coordinate these 
initiatives, given their overlapping interest in maritime security. 
Likewise, it will be interesting to see if the PSI serves as a 
model for the formation of peace and security policy and 
international law in an era increasingly characterized by weak 
global organizations and renewed challenges to international 
law. 
VI. UNITED NATIONS AND PROLIFERATION 
The Initiative's supporters are pursuing a variety of means 
to build legitimacy and political support. In addition to the 
boarding agreements, international conventions, and regional 
arrangements discussed above, they have been working to build 
support in the U.N. Security Council. 
A. Security Council Efforts 
On April 28, 2004, the U.N. Security Council unanimously 
passed one of the most sweeping resolutions in its history.154 
Basing its authority on Chapter VII of the 1945 Charter, 
UNSCR 1540 decided that all states shall (1) refrain from 
providing support to non-states seeking WMD; (2) adopt laws 
prohibiting non-state actors from acquiring WMD; and (3) take 
measures to prevent proliferation.155 Only UNSCR 1373-passed 
in the immediate wake of 9111--comes anywhere close to 
UNSCR 1540 in its ambition.156 Not only does it take a position 
maritime containers that  pose a risk for terrorism are identified and examined a t  foreign 
ports before they are shipped to the United States. See U.S. CUSTOMS FACT SHEET, supra 
note 37. 
154. For the complete text of this path breaking resolution, see S.C. Res. 1540, 
supra note 49. The ultimate resolution was cosponsored by France, the Philippines, 
Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
155. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49. 
156. Passed on September 28, 2001, the resolution required states to ensure that 
their banks do not facilitate the financing of terrorist operations, that they do not permit 
terrorists to travel, and that terrorists are unable to train within their territory. 
Resolution 1373 appears to be the first attempt of the Security Council to do anything 
resembling legislating, but this innovation has not been widely commented upon, 
probably because i t  was passed in the shadow of 9/11. See S.C. Res. 1373 U.N. Doc. 
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on behalf of the Security Council, it requires all states to pass 
domestic legislation to support its policy determinations. Prior 
to these resolutions, most experts would have agreed with the 
conclusion that there is "no legislature, in the technical sense of 
the term, in the United Nations system . . . . That is to say, there 
exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws 
directly binding on international legal  subject^."'^^ Ironically, 
President Bush and John Bolton, two determined critics of the 
United Nations, have radically expanded its capacity to act as a 
world government .I5' 
UNSCR 1540 originated in a proposal made by President 
Bush to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2003. He 
explained the new PSI briefly and requested that the Security 
Council "adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution . . . [that 
would] call on all members of the U.N. to criminalize the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict 
export controls consistent with international standards, and to 
secure any and all sensitive materials within their own 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28,2001). 
157. Stefan Talmon, The Security Council As World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 
175, 175 (2005) (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, '$43 (Oct. 2, 1995) reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 
32 (1996)). 
As Talmon notes, the new "legislationn differs from previous requirements that  states 
enact legislation in that  i t  does not refer to specific targets of such enactments by name. 
The obligations imposed are general and abstract. See id. a t  176. Instead of enacting 
sanctions against Libya or the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the 
Palestinian territories, 1373 and 1540 refer to "terroristn organizations. Id. at 176. 
158. Expanding the legal capacity, however, does not imply expanding the 
organizational capacity to ensure compliance with this virtual "legislation." Both 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 require extensive reporting requirements of each state. And, 
like unfunded mandates, they do not provide the support necessary for poor countries to 
report-let alone to comply with their terms. At least for 1540, PSI can provide material 
assistance in complying. But there remains a yawning gap in the ability of poor countries 
to effectively report on their efforts. Without adequate resources for reporting, there is 
little ability for the United States and other concerned powers to benchmark or 
otherwise improve compliance. As a consequence, there is a real need for some 
nongovernmental organization, philanthropy or pro bono practice to help the poor 
countries report on their efforts to enact and abide by Resolutions 1373 and 1540. See 
S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49; see also S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 156. 
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borders."159 In doing so, President Bush explicitly tied UNSCR 
1540 to the PSI. There are no established rules of interpretation 
for Security Council  resolution^.'^^ That said, it does seem 
significant that the resulting resolution actually goes further 
than merely to "call on all members." Instead it "[dlecides . . . 
that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, 
shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which 
prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, 
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for 
7 ~ 1 6 1  terrorist purposes . . . . In light of the importance of the issues 
addressed, the level of public scrutiny involved, and the legal 
novelty of UNSCR 1540, it seems fair to conclude that the 
Security Council was endorsing the PSI. Does this 
comprehensive endorsement extend to a delegation of Chapter 
VII authority to the PSI'S decision makers? Would it allow the 
United States and other directly interested states to use force to 
interdict passage of a nuclear weapon (or a Scud missile) on its 
way to Yemen or Somalia? 
B. Does UNSCR 1540 Fully Legitimate Forceable Counter- 
proliferation? 
Apparently not. Or rather, not yet. A British statement 
issued at the time was intended to reassure those who resisted 
an explicit authorization of interdictions on the high seas. "What 
this resolution does not do is authorise enforcement action 
against states or against non-state actors in the territory of 
another country. The resolution makes clear that it will be the 
Council that monitors its implementation. Any enforcement 
action would require a new Council decision."162 Indeed, the 
159. George W. Bush, President of the US. ,  Address to the United Nations General 
Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statementd 
usaeng030923.htm. 
160. The U.N. Charter is a treaty and as such should be interpreted in good faith, 
in accordance with ordinary means, and in light of its purpose. Presumably, resolutions 
passed under its authority should also be interpreted in light of their purpose. Vienna 
Convention, supra note 138, arts. 3(b), 31. 
161. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49, ¶ 2. 
162. Adam Thomson, Deputy Permanent &presentative of the U.K Mission of Gr. 
Heinonline - -  28 Hous. J. Int'l L. 820 2006 
20061 PROLIFERATION SECURITY INTIA TIVE 82 1 
United States dropped a provision explicitly authorizing the 
interdiction of WMD at sea in exchange for China's vote.163 The 
United States was only able to salvage a provision in paragraph 
ten that "calls upon all States, in accordance with their national 
legal authorities and legislation and consistent with 
international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit 
trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their 
means of delivery, and related materials . . . ."164 UNSCR 1540 
falls short of authorizing interdictions. But, State Department 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Andrew Semmel's 
characterization seems fair: "The PSI and 1540 are 
complementary. Paragraph ten of the resolution reflects this 
symbiosis.n165 
What further authorization would be required to authorize 
interdictions? While a new resolution pursuant to Chapter VII 
would undoubtedly suffice, perhaps a less sweeping measure 
would also work. Paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the 1945 Charter 
allows the Security Council to decide "procedural matters" by a 
mere majority.166 At some point, the Security Council may decide 
that the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by applying the PSI to 
specific situations (for example, to North Korean exports) is a 
mere procedural matter. 
UNSCR 1540 raises several other significant issues. Most 
notably, it requires states to prohibit proliferation to non-state 
actors-in effect legislating for members. The 1945 Charter, 
Brit. and N. Ir., Statement to the Security Council of the U.N. (Apr. 22,2004), available 
a t  http://www.ukun.or9/articles~show.asp?Sarticlee=l7&icleID=7. Recall that 
this discussion followed the intense debate about UNSCR 1441's authorization of force to 
compel Saddam Hussein's Iraq to abandon its WMD programs. Much of the Iraq debate 
turned on whether 1441 sufficed to authorize military action or a second resolution was 
required. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. SIRES11441 (Nov. 8,2002). 
163. Sean D. Murphy ed., UN Security Council Resolution on Nonproliferation of 
WMD, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 606, 606 (2004) (citing Colum Lynch, Weapons Transfers 
Targeted, WASH. POST, Apr. 29,2004, a t  A21). 
164. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49, ¶ 10. 
165. Andrew Semmel, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec'y of State for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540: The U.S. Perspective, Remarks 
a t  Conference on Global Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism: United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1540 delivered a t  Chatham House, London (Oct. 12, 2004), 
available a t  http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/37145.htm. 
166. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 2. 
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however, does not grant the Security Council authority to 
legislate. As a nuclear power and a nonpermanent member of 
the Security Council, Pakistan raised this issue.167 Nor does the 
1945 Charter provide the United Nations with the democratic 
apparatus generally required for legislatures to make legitimate 
law-at least in many states. Some arms control advocates 
worry that Security Council legislation is inherently 
undemocratic, that 1540 may undermine the multilateral 
treaties already binding states to limit proliferation, and that 
1540 undervalues the significant obligation of states to reduce 
168 
and eventually eliminate their own nuclear arsenals. It seems 
unfair, however, to categorize UNSCR 1540 as undermining 
existing multilateral treaties merely by binding certain states to 
limit proliferation. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The PSI'S participants are building legal and political 
support for highly-focused use of force operations to counter the 
proliferation of WMD. Eventually, these efforts may mature into 
the formation of clear and substantive law permitting highly- 
focused military operations anywhere in the world in order to 
halt the flow or prevent the use of WMD. Analogous movements 
in previous centuries took decades to ripen into universal bans 
on piracy and the international slave trade. Over the past half 
century, a similar norm has been developing to prevent 
genocide. The struggles to end piracy, the slave trade, and 
genocide have required decades. The threat of WMD is so great 
and so imminent that we do not have decades for the norm to 
mature. This recognition leads to several tentative conclusions. 
A. Put the Cat Back in the Bag 
Certainly international peace and security would be well 
served were North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons 
program. Should that objective not be achieved, any agreement 
167. See Murphy, supra note 163, at 607. 
168. See John Burroughs, Executive Dir., Lawyers' Comm. on Nuclear Policy, 
Statement at U.N. Correspondents' Association (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.reaching 
criticalwill.org/politica1~SC/SC.html#john~statement. 
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with North Korea that acknowledges its right to retain its 
nuclear weapons program should include a requirement that 
North Korea consent to having its outbound vessels boarded and 
any WMD seized. After all, counter-proliferation makes sense 
only where the cat has not already been let out of the bag. In the 
case of North Korea, the cat is out of the bag, so the concern now 
is to bag the cat on the Korean Peninsula. In the alternative, a 
specific U.N. Security Council Resolution could endorse 
interdictions or an embargo on North Korea. Perhaps China 
could be convinced to abstain from a veto if the current round of 
negotiations fail. 
B. Embrace International Law 
Counter-proliferation will be best served by harnessing 
international conventions, not marginalizing them. The 
UNCLOS should be supported in part because it offers a legal 
framework for further legitimating the PSI. Unlike all but two 
members of NATO and 145 other nations, the United States is 
not a party to the UNCLOS. When the treaty opened for 
signature in 1982, President Ronald Reagan's Special Envoy on 
the Law of the Sea Treaty, Donald Rumsfeld, worked to 
dissuade other countries from signing based on the claim that it 
would insufficiently protect U.S. interests.16' As Secretary of 
Defense in 2003, Mr. Rumsfeld reversed this position, deeming 
the treaty's protection of navigation rights as "critical to the 
United States Armed ~orces ." '~~ Two and a half years later, 
however, the Administration has not moved to ratify the treaty, 
despite claims that "it provides the only legitimate international 
framework for the [~lnitiative."~~~ In this instance, it appears 
169. See Ed Feulner, Out to Sea, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8. 2005. 
170. John A. Duff, A Note on the United States and the Law of the Sea: Looking 
Back and Moving Forward, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 195, 201 (2004) (quoting U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea Hearing, Testimony of Mark T. Esper, Deputy 
Assistant Sec'y of Def. for Negotiation Policy (Oct. 21, 2003), http://foreign.senate. 
gov/testimony/2003/EsperTestimony031021.pdf). 
171. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted nineteen to zero to 
recommend the United States enter the UNCLOS. Lawrence J .  Korb, Bush Failing at 
Nuclear Security, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 2005, a t  C11; see also Senator Richard G. 
Lugar, Law of the Sea Treaty Balances U.S. and World Interests, GLOBAL ISSUES, Apr. 
2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgidO404/ijgelgi02.htm. 
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that the Administration's antipathy to multilateral conventions 
is undermining its capacity to develop a robust coalition of the 
willing. The United States should ratify the UNCLOS. 
C. Broaden the Base 
The PSI has made great progress in terms of effectiveness 
and gaining international legitimacy. Widening the coalition 
beyond states would only enhance its effectiveness and may also 
accelerate the formation of norms essential for its eventual 
acceptance as entirely legitimate. If the PSI is to succeed, it 
means rethinking certain elemental components of the 
international legal regime. It means authorizing actions that 
previously would have been undertaken only under the rubric of 
war or deniable covert action. It means continuing to build a 
robust coalition of willing states that have few or no strong 
obligations to each other and one based on limited common 
interests or purposes. Some of the Initiative's participants, such 
as the small countries that offer flags of convenience, may even 
have been coerced into joining. PSI'S supporters should work 
toward universal acceptance of its principles. 
D. Open up the Discussion 
Exposing the PSI to a wider range of input should increase 
international confidence in it and enhance its effectiveness. 
Building it into a formal agreement with North Korea would 
give it additional legitimacy and help limit the proliferation of 
WMD. Revealing the levels of support for the PSI around the 
world would help establish the norm necessary for the creation 
of universal law. Dedicating resources to help poor or weak 
states conform to the requirements of UNSCR 1540 would give 
additional legitimacy to the Security Council's ambitious 
legislative effort and presumably give the PSI supporters more 
congenial legal frameworks. Likewise, opening up the Initiative 
to participation by nongovernmental organizations would also 
accelerate the norm-setting process and increase the PSI'S 
capabilities. 
To ensure responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, and 
fairness-and to capture the most synergies-the PSI'S leaders 
should convene some sort of congress to discuss it, to bring up 
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new and useful ideas, and to work through the concerns of 
participants. Moreover, participation in the PSI and in this 
congress ought not to  be limited to states' governments. Many 
international organizations, such as the United Nations' 
General Secretariat and the Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, 
regional organizations, humanitarian organizations, and other 
elements of civil society are effectively stakeholders, whose 
opinions should be consulted. The marketplace of ideas may well 
yield ways to improve the PSI. In the end, governments may 
ignore their advice, but inviting intelligent and well-intentioned 
people with different expertise and interests to share their views 
may bring significant and useful insights. 
At the same time, the supporters of the PSI could work to 
help individual states reform their laws so that they better 
conform to the requirements of UNSCR 1540. As noted above, 
this resolution 
[dlecides also that all States, in accordance with their 
national procedures, shall adopt and enforce 
appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state 
actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, 
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for 
terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any 
of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an 
accomplice, assist or finance them. . . . 172 
The Security Council has established a 1540 committee to 
monitor compliance. But, many states lack the legal or 
institutional capacity to conform in a timely fashion. The PSI'S 
effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if it were expanded to 
provide the means for these states to adopt appropriate 
legislation. This role could easily fit under the Initiative's 
mission of information sharing. 
The PSI has great potential. To date, however, some of its 
potential has been masked by a hesitation to be exposed to the 
marketplace of ideas. Little information is publicly available 
about the Initiative's intelligence sharing or  efforts to  increase 
the operational capacity. The Initiative's governance remains 
172. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 49. 
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obscured. No complete list of states participating publicly exists, 
let alone an official description of what constitutes support or 
participation. Exposing the PSI to public scrutiny could help 
generate additional new ideas and greater support. 
E. A Final Word 
The Initiative can play an important role in helping to 
staunch the dangerous proliferation of WMD and the means to 
create or deliver them. Whether through effective interdictions 
or by simply raising the cost above what some terrorists can 
afford to pay, it may eventually avoid untold destruction, 
suffering, and deaths. At the same time, the PSI can help reform 
the international security system by making it more flexible and 
responsive to the challenges of the twenty-first century. To 
maximize the chances to achieve these critical objectives, 
policymakers, soldiers, diplomats, and lawyers should embrace 
dialogue and international law, not shun it. 
VIII. APPENDIX: INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction 
principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis 
through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery 
systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and 
non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with 
national legal authorities and relevant international law and 
frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all 
states concerned with this threat to international peace and 
security to  join in similarly committing to: 
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in 
concert with other states, for interdicting the 
transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery 
systems, and related materials to and from states 
and non-state actors of proliferation concern. 
"States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" 
generally refers to those countries or entities that 
the PSI participants involved establish should be 
subject to interdiction activities because they are 
engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to 
develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear 
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weapons and associated delivery systems or (2) 
transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of 
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials. 
Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid 
exchange of relevant information concerning 
suspected proliferation activity, protecting the 
confidential character of classified information 
provided by other states as part of this initiative, 
dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to 
interdiction operations and capabilities, and 
maximize coordination among participants in 
interdiction efforts. 
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant 
national legal authorities where necessary to 
accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen 
when necessary relevant international law and 
frameworks in appropriate ways to support these 
commitments. 
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction 
efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery 
systems, or related materials, to the extent their 
national legal authorities permit and consistent 
with their obligations under international law and 
frameworks, to include: 
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any 
such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors 
of proliferation concern, and not to allow any 
persons subject to their jurisdiction to  do so. 
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and 
good cause shown by another state, to take 
action to board and search any vessel flying 
their flag in their internal waters or territorial 
seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any 
other state, that is reasonably suspected of 
transporting such cargoes to or from states or 
non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to 
seize such cargoes that are identified. 
c. To seriously consider providing consent under 
the appropriate circumstances to the boarding 
and searching of its own flag vessels by other 
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states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related 
cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by 
such states. 
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or 
search in their internal waters, territorial seas, 
or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that 
are reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes 
that are identified; and (2) to  enforce conditions 
on vessels entering or leaving their ports, 
internal waters or territorial seas that are 
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, 
such as requiring that such vessels be subject to 
boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes 
prior to entry. 
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and 
good cause shown by another state, to (a) require 
aircraft that are reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes to or from states or non- 
state actors of proliferation concern and that are 
transiting their airspace to land for inspection 
and seize any such cargoes that are identified; 
and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes transit rights through 
their airspace in advance of such flights. 
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are 
used as transshipment points for shipment of 
such cargoes to  or from states or non-state actors 
of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, 
aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably 
suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize 
such cargoes that are identified.173 
173. STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES, supra note 5. 
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